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Most recent studies and reports indicate that there is a significant risk of conflict 
over water sharing in the Middle East because of scarcity. Apart from exaggerating the 
scarcity of water resources and the likelihood of war, the major flaw of these assessments 
is that they just identify and do not solve the problem of water scarcity. The idea that 
water scarcity is the main source of conflict in the region is too narrow. Because water is 
so essential to life, even hostile coriparians have historically sought to compromise rather 
go to war over this resource, even as disputes have raged on other issues. The historical 
record is predominantly cooperation rather than conflict when it comes to water sharing. 
This thesis provides a clear description of why water scarcity has not caused a 
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I. THESIS INTRODUCTION 
Over the past twenty years, much has been written about the impending water 
wars that can be expected in semi-arid and arid regions across the globe. It was made 
popular by former UN Secretary - General Boutros Ghali’s statement that: “The next war 
in the Middle East will not be over politics but over water.”1 Precisely because water is 
so essential to life, even hostile co-riparian countries have historically sought to 
compromise rather go to war over water, even as disputes have raged on other issues.2  
Indeed, the historical record is predominantly one of water acting as a catalyst for 
cooperation rather than conflict. At the local and international levels, the vast majority of 
societies have sought to evolve subtle, often-unwritten, rules for collaboratively 
managing shared water resources for the common good.3  
The countries of the Euphrates-Tigris basin provides an excellent example for this 
phenomenon. The conflicts about the use of the water resources in the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin began in the early 1960s with large-scale Turkish and Syrian irrigation and 
hydropower projects on the Euphrates, and to a lesser extent on the Tigris River. Since 
the early 1960s, there have been many important crises in this region over water between 
these riparian countries. As a result, in 1992, a Pentagon report named a water war 
between Syria and Turkey as one of the first contingencies.4 By contrast, some writers 
                                                 
1 Anthony Turton, Shomenthree Moodley and Richard Meissner, “An Analysis of the Role of Virtual 
Water in Southern Africa in Meeting Water Scarcity: An Applied Research and Capacity Building Project.” 
[http://www.up.ac.za/academic/libarts/polsci/awiru/vw_study_ch3.html]. December 2002. 
2 Aaron  Wolf,  “Development  and  Transboundary  Waters:  Obstacles and  Opportunities.” 
[http://www.dams.org]. December 2002.    
3  Aaron  Wolf,  “Indigenous  Approaches to  Water  Conflict   Negotiations  and  Implications  for  
International Waters.” [http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/documents/indigenous]. December 2002.  
4  Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim S. Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East: A Context for Conflict or 
Cooperation? ( New York: ST. Martin’s Press, 2000),  p. 116.  
2 
such as Peter Gleick, argue that, “the need to manage jointly the shared water resources 
of the region may provide an unprecedented opportunity to move toward an era of 
cooperation and peace.”5  
This thesis provides a description of why water scarcity has not caused a violent 
conflict between Turkey, Syria and Iraq in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin; although 
water sharing is an endemic problem among these countries and many scholars expect a 
military conflict in the basin. I will argue along with Gleick that inevitability of conflict 
over hydro politics in this region is unconvincing for five main reasons: 
First, in the Euphrates-Tigris basin, none of the riparian countries is facing an 
imminent water shortage. Some writers purposefully exaggerate the water scarcity that 
dictates the political behavior in the basin, because it serves each riparian country’s self-
serving positioning in the future. 
Second, the three riparian countries have initiated many projects to capture, store, 
and redirect freshwater resources to reduce their vulnerability to water scarcity. 
Additionally, these expensive vulnerable water projects increased the probability of 
cooperation in the basin. More importantly, the major water problems arise primarily 
from the mode of water allocation within states rather than from water allocation between 
states. 
Third, the three riparian countries have been engaged in continuous technical 
consultations and political negotiations over water since the early 1960s. This 
demonstrates an effort to avoid water conflict. As a result, there are many treaties which 
                                                 
5 Ibid, p. 117. 
3 
have been signed by the three riparian countries that lessen the strength of water scarcity 
issue in the political arena. 
Fourth, tensions in the region are caused by a variety of factors in addition to 
concerns about water scarcity. Water is not the sole problem between parties in the 
region.  
Finally, there are some norms that countries follow while using the basin’s water 
and when there is tension in the region.  In fact, there have been acute tensions among the 
riparian countries however, they are due to a host of different variables rather than water 
scarcity (e.g., the Syrian support to Kurdish Terrorist Group ( PKK). The analysis begins 
by answering the following questions: 
1.  What are the basis for the compelling claims of water as a source of conflict 
and cooperation? 
2.  Why is water sharing problematic in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin between 
Turkey, Syria, and Iraq? 
3.  Why is water so important for each country? 
4.  What is the historical background of water usage in the basin? 
5. Although there were many important crises in the basin related to water 
disputes, why haven't they caused a violent conflict? 
Many chronic conflicts occur near rivers that are shared by different states and 
these conflicts threaten human life in some regions. Whether the historical record is 
predominantly of water acting as a catalyst for cooperation or conflict, the expectation 
that water scarcity will not cause a war is too optimistic. More important, an explanation 
4 
as to why a water conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin has not caused a violent 
conflict between Turkey, Iraq and Syria could provide a preemptive solution to potential 
crises—crises that could escalate to a war within the Euphrates-Tigris and other basins. 
Additionally, it can provide beneficial information while making some predictions about 
the conditions under which water scarcity can cause a war in this and other regions.  
Chapter II presents the main alternative hypotheses on water conflict. The first 
hypothesis suggests that scarcity of water will be the key factor in any future conflict in 
this region. The second hypothesis accepts the idea of water as merely a contributing 
factor rather than the major source of any possible conflict. A third viewpoint proposes 
that water scarcity and its potential for conflict is a technical problem. Many engineers 
and economists believe that the problem can be solved technically. A fourth hypothesis 
suggests that the history of water disputes is one of cooperation, not conflict.  
Chapter III investigates why water sharing is problematic in Euphrates-Tigris 
River Basin between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq and summarizes each riparian country’s 
perspectives on the water conflict. Water sharing is problematic because of geographical 
and climatic conditions in the region, combined with the countries’ increasing 
populations and level of economic development. Additionally, every major river in the 
basin crosses one or more international borders. The water environment in an upstream 
country has a direct effect on the nature of the river downstream, and vice versa. By 
contrast, the total amount of water planned to be used by the riparian countries exceeds 
the total flow capacity of the rivers. The chapter will show that international law and 
international institutions do not establish a clear framework that can satisfy the water use 
needs of all riparian states. To resolve the region's conflicts and maintain stability, it 
5 
becomes the responsibility of the concerned countries to develop a corporate solution to 
their problems. 
  Economic, political, and ethnic concerns of each state at the domestic level, 
strategic concerns of the respective states, economic difficulties in the region, and the 
increasing need for energy dominate their security policies. They believe domestic 
political stability and economic advancement are more profitable than a basin-wide 
cooperation that will satisfy the demands of each riparian. It is this self-serving cost-
benefit mindset that dictates the political behavior of the riparian states of the Euphrates-
Tigris basin.  
 After explaining why water sharing is problematic in the basin and what each 
country’s perspective over water conflict is, Chapter IV further explains why water 
disputes have not caused a violent conflict. This chapter clarifies the international water-
related agreements which have been established since partition of the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin among the three parties. It shows some norms that Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have 
followed while using the basin’s water. Chapter IV also explains other reasons for tension 
in the region and the projects that the three riparian countries have initiated to capture, 
store, and redirect the basin’s fresh water. Chapter IV suggests that the three riparian 
countries are not facing an imminent water crisis.  
Hydro politics gradually became a major international issue in Mesopotamia and 
the Middle East in 1960s. However, until 1975, neither the absence of integrated planning 
in the entire basin nor the lack of comprehensive agreement among three riparian 
countries on a water-sharing regime, led to any international friction among them, 
6 
because of the relative abundance of water in the basin which could satisfy all parties.6 
The relative abundance of water in the basin did not, however, prevent the riparian 
countries of the basin from conducting some bilateral or trilateral negotiations. As a 
result, the three riparian parties facilitated a peaceful course of development in the region. 
This cooperative mode of conduct has often been overlooked by Western commentators 
who incline towards presenting conflict-oriented scenarios.7  
 Turkey and Iraq established the Joint Technical Committee to continue the 
efforts to reach a solution that would satisfy the needs of the riparian states in the basin in 
1980. Syria entered this group in 1983, and this tripartite committee began its work on 
the basis of exchanging information about the two rivers. Turkey offered a “Three-Staged 
Plan for Optimum, Equitable, and Reasonable Utilization of the Basin.” In addition to 
this, in the mid-1980s, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal offered peace pipeline 
projects to Middle East countries that would transport water from two western Turkish 
rivers, the Seyhan and Ceyhan, southward to Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the other 
Gulf States. Iraq and Syria have both perceived this proposal as an infringement in their 
domestic affairs. Furthermore, with the initiation of Turkey’s GAP8 Project in the mid-
1980s, Syria and Iraq saw it as a threat to their economic and strategic goals. As a result, 
the three riparian countries started to give little importance to the Joint Technical 
Committee and its projects could never be initiated. Nevertheless, the role of the Joint 
Technical Committee should not be underestimated. Although its meetings are infrequent 
                                                 
6 Ibid, p. 131. 
7 Ibid, p. 131. 
8 Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP, Turkish acronym). It is explained on page 82. 
7 
and appear to have made little substantive progress on the question of water sharing, it is 
a useful channel for communication.9  
Relating to norms, the historical data basically proves that upper stream countries 
never wanted to make down stream countries suffer from water scarcity and always 
released as much water as they could.   They did not use water as a political weapon. 
The post-1984 period marked the escalation of the Kurdish problem and 
witnessed the internationalization of the Kurdish issue as Syria and Iran began to use the 
so-called “ethnic card.”  The escalation of the water dispute clearly corresponds to the 
escalation of the Kurdish problem and the increasing use of "ethnic card" by Syria, and 
later by Iraq, as a bargaining chip. This suggests that the solution to the Kurdish problem 
is intrinsically linked to the resolution of the water dispute and that finding a solution to 
one without finding a solution to the other would be very difficult if not impossible. 
Water, however,  is only one of the factors that causes problem in region between 
Turkey, Syria and Iraq.10 The other factors include territorial disputes (between Syria and 
Turkey) over Hatay, internal problems, the domestic political situation of each country, 
the Kurdish problem, and many other issues unrelated to water. Therefore, the lack of 
cooperation between the riparian countries in their hydro politics policies is not a result of 
water shortages in the region.11 
The overall process of water resources development in the basin during the last 
three decades has been in accordance with previous agreements signed by the three 
                                                 
9 Natasha Beschorner, Water and Instability in the Middle East, Adelphi Paper-273 (London: Brassey’s, 
1992), p.42. 
10  Ibid, p.27. 
11 Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, p. 138. 
8 
riparian states in order to regulate the flow. The construction of enormous water storage 
capacity in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq has partially enhanced their sense of water security, 
while increasing the vulnerability to their expensive water projects. Additionally, 
“exploitation of water resources typically requires expensive—and vulnerable—civil  
engineering systems such as dams and pipelines. This creates a mutual hostage situation, 
which greatly reduces the incentives for states’ sources to employ violence to resolve 
conflicts. Furthermore, there is evidence that the development of water resources by 
antagonistic neighbors creates a network of common interest.”12 
The annual discharge of the rivers has been more than enough for three riparian 
countries needs. They have purposefully exaggerated the water scarcity that dictates the 
political behaviors related to the basin, however, because each riparian country has a self-
serving, cost-benefit mindset regarding the future. Although the extreme seasonal and 
annual fluctuations of the twin rivers have always been a great challenge to parties, it has 
led them towards collective cooperation to solve their problems and control the water 
resources of the basin due to its abundance of water.  
In addition to all of these, Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim S. Gray conclude that: 
In the process of their diplomatic exchange, all parties have understood that the 
international water resources cannot be monopolized or subjected to the control of 
a single riparian state. This active, continuous, and critical interchange has also 
convinced them that cooperation over the water issue is not necessarily a zero-
sum game, but could be a win-win situation in which all parties would gain from 
cooperation.13 
In contrast to what is conventionally believed, water resources have not yet 
caused a military conflict in Euphrates-Tigris basin. The aim of this study is to establish 
                                                 
12 Ibid, p. 20. 
13 Ibid, p. 156. 
9 
that the conventional wisdom of “water war in Euphrates-Tigris River Basin” has become 
somewhat of an exaggeration by pessimistic commentators who seldom attempt to clarify 
precisely what water-related causes of conflict are and what they are not. In reality, since 
ancient times, parties in the basin have been forced to cooperate and coordinate their 
collective efforts to control the two rivers because of the hydrography of the rivers. 
Although, occasionally there were small water-related tensions between the three riparian 



























































II. THE MAIN ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS ABOUT CONFLICT 
AND COOPERATION ON WATER SHARING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When we look at the earth from space, it is easy to understand why our planet is 
called a blue planet, since three fourths of the earth’s surface is covered by water. 
However, 98% of this surface water is in the oceans and the remaining two percent 
comprises the fresh water supplies of the world. More shocking, 90% of this fresh water 
supply is either in poles or remains underground. Therefore, we humans actually have 
easy access to .000006% of water available.14  
The distribution of fresh water resources around the world is uneven.15 Moreover, 
since the world is divided into many sovereign states, water stored in rivers or aquifers 
may pass from one state to another or may constitute boundaries between them thus 
making the water issue more problematic. The world has not faced a global water crisis, 
yet, but many chronic conflicts among common rivers, while sharing their water, threaten 
human life in some regions.  
For instance, in late 1993, the CIA issued a report pinpointing ten regions around 
the world it believed would witness conflicts over water. Most of them were in the 
Middle East where water is blue gold because of its scarcity. Crises have already begun to 
emerge in the region between Turkey and Syria over the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers; in 
the Jordan River Basin between Israel, Palestine and Jordan; and among Egypt, Sudan 
and Ethiopia over the Nile River. 
                                                 
14 Salih Korkutan, The Sources of Conflict in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin and Its Strategic Consequences in 
the Middle East, Master’s Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, June 2001. p. 1.  
15 Ibid, p.1. 
12 
The idea that water scarcity is a primary source of conflict, however, is too 
narrow. Some of the important examples of water-related conflicts were a function of the 
relationships among social, political, and economic factors.16  
B.        LINK BETWEEN WATER AND CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: 
Shrinking and deteriorating water reserves, increasing droughts together with 
rising water budgets that are hardly affordable are all clear signals of water crises facing 
humanity in different parts of the globe. While both quantity and quality of water are 
decreasing mainly because of population growth, agricultural needs, industrial 
requirements, and possible global warming, this situation creates increasing levels of 
relative scarcity over time. These facts suggest that growing problems on water issues 
need to be better understood if they are to be solved. As a result, the literature on water 
conflicts is very extensive, including many disciplines and many approaches. 
Social scientists, economists, engineers, natural scientists and many others are 
now talking about the link between water and conflict or cooperation. Analyses by 
various scholars yielded confusing conclusions, varying from a threat of war over water, 
to potential for cooperation among the riparian nations. 
The main argument of proponents of water scarcity conflicts is that as water 
becomes scarcer, countries that share international river basins could revert to violent 
conflict to secure more water since about 40% of the river basins in the world are shared 
among two or more nations. Although the scenarios about water generally involve 
conflicts, the other side of the coin is cooperation. In this chapter the two main 
                                                 
16 Environment, Development & Conflict (EDC News) Web page, “Water Conflict Databases.” 
[http://www.padrigu.gu.se/EDCNews/Research/WaterConflictDatabases.html]. December 2002. 
13 
approaches of water scarcity—security and environmental—are identified. Additionally, 
the link between water scarcity and cooperation is explained.  
Detailed discussion of these two approaches in this chapter leads to the conclusion 
that, since water plays a multifunctional role in shaping the national security calculations, 
economy, culture, religion, nutrition, health, and every other aspect of human life, the 
relationship between cause and effect of water scarcity conflicts as it has been assumed 
by many social scientists is questionable. Because of the lack of analytical precision, the 
concept of water conflict is ambiguously used in the literature by many social scientists 
that look at the issue from a narrow, militarized perspective. 
Before explaining the two main approaches to water scarcity, it will be useful to 
explain of the term water scarcity and hydro politics.  This will help to clarify the 
interaction between different actors in particular states on the external and internal water 
issues. Actual scarcity may be said to exist when real demand or need exceeds the real 
supply. As Anthony Turton, Shomenthree Moodley and Richard Meissner define: 
Hydro politics is the systematic examination of the interaction between states, 
non-state entities and other relevant participants like individuals… within the 
national domain and international political milieu, regarding the authoritative 
allocation and/or use of international and national water resources like rivers, 
aquifers, lakes, glaciers, and wetlands.17 
1.      Water as a Security Issue:  
A realist approach of world politics, which suggests a positive relationship 
between scarcity and conflict claims that resources have been central to international 
conflict throughout history, sometimes having a starring role but more frequently being 
                                                 
17 Turton, Moodley and Meissner, An Analysis of the Role of Virtual Water in Southern Africa in Meeting 
Water Scarcity. 
14 
pushed in to the background.18 Most of the military analysts claim that fresh water is 
similar in many respects to other of the world’s scarce resources, while it is becoming 
increasingly a source of future conflict.  
According to this approach, water is a source of power and water scarcity is a 
critical and highly strategic issue that affects the social and economic development of 
nations and, consequently, threatens to undermine their political power. Additionally, 
supporters of this approach predict that states are prepared to go to a war to ensure a 
steady supply of water for their present needs and future demands. For instance, while 
explaining whether environmental scarcity causes violent conflict, Thomas Homer-Dixon 
suggests that decreasing supplies of physically controllable environmental resources, 
such as clean water, would provoke interstate “simple-scarcity” conflicts.  
Additionally, Homer-Dixon suggests that severe resources scarcity would 
simultaneously increase economic deprivation while categorizing the sources in two 
groups: (1) nonrenewable, like oil and iron ore, and (2) renewable, like fresh water and 
forests. He gives environmental change as one of the three sources of scarcity of 
renewable resources. The commonly used term environmental change refers to a human-
induced decline in the quantity or quality of a renewable resource that occurs faster than 
it is renewed by natural processes.19 The others are population growth and unequal social 
distribution of resources.  
According to Homer-Dixon, reduction in the quantity or quality of a resource 
shrinks the resource pie, while population growth divides the pie into smaller slices for 
                                                 
18 Chester Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, eds., Managing Global Chaos (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 141. 
19 Homer Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.” 
[http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/evidence/evid1.htm]. December 2002.    
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each individual, and unequal resource distribution means that some groups get 
disproportionately large slices.20 We must also recognize that resource scarcity is, in part, 
subjective; it is determined not just by absolute physical limits, but also by preferences, 
beliefs, and norms.21   
Homer-Dixon’s research suggests that the renewable resource most likely to 
stimulate interstate resource war is river water, since water is a critical resource for 
personal and national survival. Additionally, over the shared river basin, one country's 
access can be affected by another’s actions. Downstream riparian countries often fear that 
their upstream neighbors will use water as a means of coercion. This situation can be 
dangerous and a source of violent conflict if the downstream country also believes that it 
is powerful enough to rectify the situation. 
Similarly, Peter Gleick says that as water becomes scarcer, the likelihood will 
increase that water and water-supply systems will become more and more the source of 
violent conflict. In addition to climatic changes three major drivers will cause this: (1) 
population growth, (2) improved living standards, and (3) expansion of irrigated 
agriculture. All three factors have increased dramatically and have led to about a seven-
fold increase in freshwater withdrawals as seen in Figure-1.22 Thus, shortages of water 
could contribute to tensions and violent conflict between and with in states. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Peter H. Gleick, “The Changing Water Paradigm, A Look at Twenty-first Century Water Resources 
Development.” [http://www.iwra.siu.edu/win/win2000/win03-00/gleick.pdf]. December 2002.   
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Water, from an economic point of view, also can be a reason for water-related 
conflicts. Recently the economic value of water has gained recognition in societies at 
various levels of development, since the importance of water as a national security issue 
relates its role to the prosperity of a nation.24 On this issue, Anthony Turton says:  
Water scarcity need not necessarily result in heated conflict and, in fact, can 
instead become the catalyst for increased cooperation. What really needs to be 
done is to empower this instrument to become one of peace and cooperation 
rather than one of conflict and division. How this is done depends on the way the 
respective role-players interact. In short, indications are that water scarcity need 
not necessarily become a limitation to economic growth and potential, provided 
that conflict can be effectively managed and that cooperation can be 
stimulated…25  
 
By contrast, Analysis by some scholars concluded that the water disputes result in 
cooperation, not conflict. For instance, Aaron Wolf says that the real story of water 
disputes is one of surprising cooperation in the long run, even among mortal enemies. In 
support of his thesis, Aaron Wolf has examined water treaties all over the globe going 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Hussein Solomon, “From Cold War to Water Wars.” [http://www.euconflict.org/dev/ECCP/ECCP 
Surveys_v0_10.nsf/wvSearchResults/31A6AB664AF9CEDCC1256B270037A4A8?OpenDocument&highl
ight=0,sadc]. April 2003.   
25 Gina van Schalkwyk, “Multiliteral Cooperation Around Shared Water Courses in the Southern African 
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back almost 5,000 years.26 During his investigation, Wolf found one single war that was 
actually linked to a water resource conflict; there have been no further wars over water.27  
Additionally, countries cooperate not only for the management of this scarce 
resource, but also as an instrument to build and strengthen linkages between them. For 
example, on the Hungarian and Slovakian border, citizens on both sides of the river, in a 
region fraught with ethnic violence, came together to meet and discuss how to clean up 
the pollution, to manage the water and to reduce terrible health risks to themselves and 
their children. 
There is little empirical support for the idea that environmental scarcity causes 
simple-scarcity conflicts between states. Scarcities of renewable resources such as fresh 
water do not often cause resource wars between states, because states fight more over 
non-renewable than renewable resources.28  
Why are states more war prone over non-renewable than renewable resources? 
First of all, non-renewable resources can be more directly converted into state power. 
Second, the very countries, which are most dependent on renewable resources, and which 
are therefore most motivated to seize resources from their neighbors, also tend to be poor, 
which lessens their capability for aggression.29 Furthermore, although resource scarcity 
can aggravate existing conflicts and make them more acute, resource scarcity alone is not 
a determining factor for countries to go to war. 
                                                 
region.” [http://www.student-pugwash.org/uk/vanSchalkwyk.pdf]. December 2002. 
26 David Stauth, “History of Water Disputes is Cooperation, not Conflict.” 





In their article, Shared Rivers and Interstate Conflict, Hans Petter Wollebaek, Nils 
Petter Gleditsch, and Havard Hegre argue that, while a strong case can be made that 
competition over water resources may exacerbate conflict and contribute to interstate 
violence, in fact its foundation is quite weak. The authors conclude that both the 
existence of a joint river and water scarcity are shown to be risk factors but these results 
are far from strong. Moreover, most of the historical examples indicate that not all water-
resource disputes lead to violent conflict since everyone’s vulnerability to interruption of 
water supply will make war less likely; indeed most lead to discussions, negotiations, 
mediations, and non-violent resolutions.  
This argument has been briefly advanced by Daniel Deudney. According to 
Deudney, the development of jointly owned water resources will reinforce peace rather 
than conflict. He explains that:30  
Exploitation of water resources typically requires expensive – and vulnerable – 
civil engineering systems such as dams and pipelines. Large dams, like nuclear 
power plants, are potential weapons in the hands of an enemy. This creates a 
mutual hostage situation which greatly reduces the incentives for states to employ 
violence to resolve conflicts. Furthermore, there is evidence that the development 
of water resources by antagonistic neighbors creates a network of common 
interest. 
 
There are economists, by contrast, who reject the alleged strategic importance of 
water as a unique resource and argue that water scarcity is basically an economic 
problem, which will be alleviated if nations treat water as an economic asset.31 According 
to supporters of this approach, a water problem is really an allocation problem and the 
problem of scarcity could be easily solved since there is enough water worldwide and 
                                                 
30 Daniel Deudney, “Environment and Security: Muddle Thinking.” 
[http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1991/a91/a91deudney.html]. April 2003. 
31 Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, p. 16. 
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people are willing to pay the cost. Thus, the solution lies in the application of the market 
mechanism.  
Some scholars also see water as a technical issue, while optimistically 
maintaining faith in the ability of science, technology, and human ingenuity to 
accommodate the world’s population demand for water. While drawing attention to 
supply-side inefficiencies, they suggest that there is enough water on the earth to satisfy 
everyone’s water needs; the problem is whether appropriate technology is available to 
utilize this resource.32 They claim that a technological management of water resources 
together with the help of market mechanism can solve the water scarcity problem. 
2.      Water as an Environmental Issue: 
The environmental approach relates the water crisis to wider environmental 
issues, while believing that the water crisis is part and parcel of the global environmental 
crisis that the earth is facing today.  Environmentalists argue that the earth has finite 
resources and capacities, and these mortal sources place limits on our use of them while 
they are becoming scarcer. From this perspective, water scarcity is an environmental 
problem caused by our misguided conduct toward nature and our unsustainable policies 
for exploitation of this resource.  
Although environmentalists claim that any resort to military, economic or 
technological solutions would not only fail to solve the problem, but would actually 
exacerbate it.  The environmental approach to resource scarcity takes into account the 
security, economic and technical dimensions of the issue. For instance, water conflict in 
terms of environmental conflict is “caused by a human-sourced disturbance of the normal 
                                                 
32 Ibid, p. 41. 
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regeneration rate of a renewable resource”33 and intensified competition for declining 
resources.  
This is the main realist argument on the subject of hydro politics. The dynamic 
process of managing freshwater resources and human demands for water is changing 
everyday. A reliance on physical solutions continues to dominate traditional planning 
approaches. These solutions, however, are facing increasing opposition internally and 
externally especially among the common rivers.  One country’s water project, such as 
building a dam to control the water, causes great tension since the other riparian countries 
see it as a threat to their economy, national security, and sovereignty. There is a lack of 
hard evidence to substantiate this realist view, because international relations over shared 
freshwater resources were overwhelmingly cooperative.34 
Water scarcity, as an environmental issue, should be looked at from the 
perspective of “environmental politics,” which is very different from the traditional 
perspective of “power politics.” Since environmental security is an alternative to the 
prevailing concept of national security, and strongly endorses collective solutions, it 
serves to shift policy-makers away from conventional realist positions based on 
protecting their narrowly defined national interests by the application of strong military 
capabilities.35 This perspective turns the water scarcity issues into an opportunity for 
cooperation and a powerful inducement to promote peace. 
                                                 
33 Roy Allison and Lena Johnson, eds., Central Asian Security: The New International Context 
(Washington, D.C. and London: Brookings Institution Press and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
2001), p.69. 
34 Shira Yoffe, “Basins at Risk.” [http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/projects/bar/BAR_ 
chapter5.pdf]. December 2002. 
35 Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, p. 17. 
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In an ongoing effort to understand the connections between water resources and 
conflict, the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security, 
under Peter Gleick’s leadership, initiated a project in the late 1980s to track and 
categorize events related to water and conflict. Their categorization includes the 
following terms: 
 Control of Water Resources: Water supplies or access to water is at the root of 
tensions.  
 Military Tool: Water resources, or water systems themselves, are used by a 
nation or state as a weapon during a military action.  
 Political Tool: Water resources, or water systems themselves, are used by a 
nation, state, or non-state actor to achieve a political goal.  
 Terrorism: Water resources, or water systems, are either targets or tools of 
violence or coercion by non-state actors. This is a new definition and will be 
further clarified for the next version of the chronology in a new project on 
"Environmental Terrorism" at the Pacific Institute.  
 Military Target: Water resource systems are targets of military actions by 
nations or states.  
 Development Disputes: Water resources or systems are a major source of 
contention and dispute in the context of economic and social development.36 
This study's main argument is that water resources have rarely been the sole 
source of violent conflict or war.37 After categorizing water related conflicts, as Gleick 
says, “It will be clear to even the casual reader that these definitions are imprecise and 
                                                 
36 Peter Gleick, , “Environment and Security: Water Conflict Chronology.” 
[http://www.worldwater.org/conflictIntro.htm]. December 2002. 
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that single events can fall into more than one category, depending on perceptions and 
definitions.”38 For instance, military attacks on water supply systems can be categorized 
into (1) either targets or tolls, or both, (2) either political power disputes or disagreements 
over approaches to economic development, or both, and (3) can cause disputes over 
control of water resources. A portion of Gleick’s Water Chronology database is shown at 
Figure  2. 39  On the chart, “yes” means “violent conflict” while “no” means “no violent 
conflict.”   













                                                 
37 Ibid. 





In Gleick’s chronology, no case identifies water as a causi-belli. Gleick found 
only three disputes where water seems to have been the sole cause for conflict 
(development disputes, control of water resources). One incident, however, caused a 
violent conflict in India in 1991. When other reasons appear to be the cause of the 
conflict, such as military and political tool and target, however, water becomes more 
problematic, but generally we see water conflict or scarcity as the result of some other 
conflict, or water as one of many factors contributing to conflict. 
After examining many water disputes which occurred over the last five Centuries, 
Gleick concludes that water itself is not the sole cause of violent conflict. Even in the 
highly charged Middle East, perhaps the world’s most prominent meeting place for high 
politics and high water tension, arguably only one incident can be pointed to as the cause 
of war—which  was in the Jordan River Basin. Indeed the riparian continued to meet at 
what was called the "table talks" throughout periods of conflict and calm. 
There are those who say there will be war over water, those who say there might 
be conflict over water, and those who say there will be cooperation between states over 
water resources. In other words, there are regionally several points of views regarding the 
importance of water.  
The first argument suggests that scarcity of water is the key factor in any future 
conflict in particular regions. The second argument accepts the idea of water as merely a 
contributing factor rather than the major source of any possible conflict. A third 
viewpoint sees the scarcity and the potential conflicts as a technical problem. Engineers 
and economists believe that the problem can be solved technically. Therefore, no single 
theory or approach has as yet been developed that can deal with the layered political, 
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socio-economic, and strategic entanglements of fresh water that underlie hydro-conflict. 
Since water are so multifaceted, has so many applications, and involves so many inter 
relationships, if existing water conflict models are to work at all, they must be based on 
narrowly conceived, fairly simple assumptions and relatively small data sets too restricted 
to contain all the intricacies of water.41 
All in all, fears of water wars are fed by the perception of global water crisis and 
recent unsettled conflicts over trans-boundary rivers. Evidence suggests, however, that 
water resources and increasing scarcity in and by themselves have not led to the outbreak 
of war, although conflict over the control of water resources has occurred between 
riparian countries.”42 For example, Turton concludes that, “water wars are nothing more 
than a myth.”43 It must not be forgotten that although the water wars are unlikely to 
happen, issues of water scarcity problems will be at the forefront of the international 
agenda for decades to come, such as in Euphrates-Tigris River Basin. The next chapter 
will focus on why water is problematic in this basin and summarize each country’s 






                                                 
41 Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon, eds., Water in the Arap world: Perspectives and Prognoses (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1994), p.261. 
42 Waltina Scheumann and Axel Klaphake, “The Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Use of 
International Watercourses.” [http://www.water-2001.de/supporting/WaterConvention.pdf]. December 
2002.   
43 Hussein Solomon and Anthony Turton, eds., Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending Reality (Bonn: 
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2000), p.166. 
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III. WHY IS WATER SHARING PROBLEMATIC AND SO 
IMPORTANT IN THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS RIVER BASIN? 
 
A.        WHY WATER SHARING IS PROBLEMATIC IN EUPHRATES-TIGRIS 
RIVER BASIN 
During the course of the history, water has been a limiting factor of production 
and has played a central role in shaping political relationships in the Middle East. It has 
affected the standard of living and life styles of people since ancient times. Maps of 
ancient civilizations show that people usually located along water ways, and expanded 
along rivers and seashores.44 Moreover, water has always been scarce in the land between 
the Nile and the Euphrates Rivers. Especially in the Euphrates–Tigris River Basin, the 
source of life for three riparian countries, water has become a cause of tension now that 
each country has initiated projects to control the river’s water for their needs. 
The Tigris and Euphrates are two of the longest and most pivotal rivers in the 
Middle East. Both rise in the high mountains of northeastern Anatolia and flow down 
through Turkey, Syria, and Iraq and eventually join to form the Shatt Al-Arab 200 km 
before they flow into the Gulf. The Euphrates River has its springs in the highlands of 
Eastern Turkey and its mouth at the Persian Gulf. Additionally, it is the longest river in 
Southwestern Asia at 2,700 km, and its actual annual volume is 35.9 billion cubic meters 
(bcm.).45 The Tigris is the second longest river in Southwest Asia at 1,840 km and its 
                                                 
44 Elisha Kally and Gideon Fishelson, Water and Peace: Water Resources and the Arab – Israeli Peace 
Process (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 1993), p.3. 
45 John F. Kolars and William Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development 
Project (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), p.23. 
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actual volume is approximately 42 bcm.46 The following explains the reasons why the 
water is problematic in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin: 
1.      Geography and Climate: 
The Middle East is one of the most arid regions in the world and a transitional 
zone between equatorial and middle latitude climates. The annual rainfall is meager, the 
summer mouths are exceedingly hot and dry—median temperatures approach 50 degrees 
Celsius and daytime relative humidity is as low as 15 per cent.47  As a result, evaporation 
in the basin is very high, especially during the summer season.  
The basin’s water is enriched by autumn and spring rains and sustained by winter 
snows. Due to the erratic climatic condition mentioned above, the flow of the Euphrates 
and Tigris Rivers is constantly fluctuating. These two factors worsen the problem of 
irrigation from these rivers and require each riparian country to control the water and 
supply of these rivers by establishing dams which causes tensions between them.  
2.    Hydrography of the Basin:  
The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers exhibit distinctive characters. They receive all 
their waters near their sources, and they become smaller as they flow to the sea. Besides 
the extreme seasonal variation in the velocity of the rivers, the annual discharge also 
varies greatly from year to year which makes water management more problematic (See 
Figure 348 and Figure 449). For example, the minimum flow of the Euphrates is reported 
                                                 
46 Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, p. 121. 
47 Ibid, p. 120. 
48 Arnon Soffer, Rivers of Fire: The Conflict over Water in The Middle East (United States of America: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), p. 81.  
49 Ibid, p. 81. 
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to be as low as 100 to 180 cubic meters per second (cm3/s) during the summer, while the 
maximum flow could reach 5,200 to 7,000 cm3/s when the spring snows melt.50 In April 
and May the Euphrates’s flow becomes eight times higher than that in August and 
October.51  











 The rivers annual flow cycles in natural conditions have three distinct periods52 
(see Figure 5): 
                                                 
50 Ibid, p. 122. 
51 George Joffe, The Issue of Water in the Middle East and North Africa in Caroline, in Thomas and Darryl 
Howlett, eds., Research Politics: Fresh Water and Regional Relations (Buckingham: Open University 
Press, 1993), p.73. 




(a) First Period: A minor rise in the rainy season, from November to March, 
during which 20 percent of the annual percent of the annual flow occurs. 
(b) Second Period: A major rise in the spring, during which the rivers are in spate 
as a result of snowmelt in the mountains of Turkey and augmented by seasonal rainfall. 
This period normally lasts from April to June and contributes 70 percent of the total 
annual flow. 
(c) Third Period: A summer low water, lasting from July to October, with only 10 
percent of annual flow. 









As far as agriculture is concerned, the rivers’ seasonal fluctuation is very 
unfavorable because its rise is too late for winter crops and too early for summer corps. 54 
Therefore, considerable engineering capacity and an efficient water-management system 
are required to control the rivers’ water. Although upper stream countries’ water 
management projects cause controversy in the basin, it is not only beneficial but also 
                                                 
53 Soffer, Rivers of Fire, p. 78. 
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necessary to the downstream state. Also, this situation increases the interdependency 
between riparian countries, since none of them can solve this problem alone. 
3. Population and Economy: 
Given the importance of water in the region, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq want to use 
the basin’s water for their industrial and agricultural development.  The scarcity of water 
resources exacerbates the regional tensions already present among governments. Indeed, 
all the states of Euphrates-Tigris River Basin which have pursued economic reform 
heavily relying on industrialization (especially Turkey) and agriculture. The rapid 
population growth (see Table 1), level of economic development, urbanization, 
increasing irrigated land (see Table 2) needed to satisfy increasing food demand, rising 
living standards, and the lack of environmentally sensitive technology adversely affected 
the quality and quantity of fresh water in the region. As a result, the usage of the 
Euphrates and Tigris Rivers' water has increased in the past decades and has caused  
tension in the basin.  
Table 1: Euphrates and Tigris Riparians: Basic Socioeconomic Data55 
POPULATION Population Growth 
(%) 
Agriculture as percentage 
of GNP 
 
1995 2010 1980-1992 1992-2005 1965 1993 
Turkey 61 80 2.3 1.9 34 15 
Syria 15 24 3.3 3.3 29 30 
Iraq 20 34 3.6 3.8 18 16a 
a 1989 
                                                 
54 Ibid, p. 123. 
55 Ibid, p. 107. 
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                   Table 2: Irrigated Land Data of Turkey, Syria and Iraq 
Country 1993 estimation56 1998 estimation57 
Turkey 36,740 sq. km. 42,000 sq. km. 
Syria 9,060 sq. km. 12,130 sq. km. 
Iraq 25,500 sq. km. 35,250 sq. km. 
 
4. Basin’s Insufficient Amount of Water for Future Use:  
In the face of increasing population, industrialization and irrigation need, the 
access to water resources has become of vital importance for the riparian states since 
there is decreasing water consumptions per capita in the region as we see in the Table 358. 




Water-Rich Countries (U.S., Canada) 10,000 8,000 
Iraq 2,110 950 
Turkey 1,830 980 




                                                 
56 The World Factbook 2001, “Irrigated Land.” [http://www.bartleby.com/151/a16.html]. April 2003. 
57 The World Factbook 2002, “Field Listing-Irrigated Land.” 
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2146.html]. April 2003. 
58 Republic of Turkey  Ministry of Foreign Affairs Home Page, “A Scramble For Water Resources Is 
Under Way In The Middle East” [m http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ac/aci/default.htm]. December 2002. 
59 Ibid. 
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5. Trans-boundary Character: 
Every major river in the basin crosses one or more international borders. Both the 
Euphrates and Tigris Rivers rise in the mountains of southern Turkey and flow 
southeastwards, the Tigris flowing directly into Iraq from Turkey and the Euphrates 
crosses Syria into Iraq. As a result, the water environment in an upstream country has a 
direct effect on the nature of the river downstream, and vice versa. The commonality of 
the water resources and their scarcity has rendered them a source of conflict among the 
riparian countries that share them 
6. Unreliable Information: 
Underlining the significance of the  acquisition, verification and analysis of data 
for a rational water management system, Kolars states that: 
Data regarding stream flow, precipitation, evapotranspiration, water removals, 
return flow, salinity and a host of other variables are notoriously scarce, 
incomplete and open to question everywhere in the Middle East.60   
A lack of reliable and mutually accepted information about the overall inventory 
of water resources is another obstacle to resolving the water conflicts in the Euphrates–
Tigris Rivers Basin. There are wide discrepancies between different accounts of 
hydrological data concerning the Euphrates-Tigris basin. This also is the case  regarding 
the current levels of water extraction for irrigation and plans for development. This 
situation can mislead observers 
7. Unrealistic Existing Demands: 
The total amount of water, planned to be used by the riparian countries exceeds 
the total flow capacity of the rivers due to their expected future demands. Obviously, it is 
                                                 
60 Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, p. 155. 
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impossible to meet such demands as far as the river’s potential flow capacity is concerned 
as seen in the Figures 6 and 7.61   
Figure 662: Water Potential of the Euphrates River and the Consumption Targets 








Figure 763: Water Potential of the Tigris River and the Consumption Targets of 
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8.    International Law and Trans-boundary Rivers:  
International rivers pose a particular problem in the context of international law 
since the rules of international law only deal with the rights and interests of the riparian 
states. The disagreement in the Euphrates–Tigris River Basin among Turkey, Syria, and 
Iraq centers on different interpretations of international law. 
The literature of international water management applies five principles of equal 
importance regarding the judgment of demands on a basin. In the Euphrates-Tigris case, 
three of them become important depending mainly on each riparian state’s position with 
relation to the water sources in terms of their interest. These are: 
 The principle of absolute territorial sovereignty (the Harmon Doctrine),  
 Absolute territorial integrity, and 
 The principle of prior appropriation. 
The first principle of “absolute sovereignty” is advantageous to the upstream state 
because it regards water bodies as an integral part of a state’s national territory. 
Meanwhile, the downstream states prefer the second principle of absolute integrity that 
allows them to accuse, and perhaps even censure, the upstream state for illegally taking 
measures which are disadvantageous to its territory.  Clearly, when these two principles 
of international law come into conflict, they do not permit a reconciliation of interests. 
The third principle of  “prior appropriation,” which favors neither the upstream nor the 
downstream state, but rather the state that puts the water to use first, thereby protecting 
those uses which existed prior in time. 
34 
The Helsinki Rules and the UN convention on trans-boundary rivers highlight the 
ambiguity of international law when it comes to water resources. There are three 
important articles in the Helsinki Rules relating to the water issue in the Middle East:64 
 With Article IV, each basin state is given the right to use the “International 
Drainage Basin” reasonably, equitably, and beneficially. The importance 
of Article IV was that, for the first time the idea of using the international 
waters beneficially rather than water by itself was decided in the 
international law. 
 In Article V, the factors that define the equitable and reasonable uses of 
the trans-boundary rivers were presented. 
 Article VII asserts the obligation not to cause significant harm to 
downstream riparian while using the river basin.65 
      a.   Arguments of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and the International Water Law 
Iraq bases its arguments on the principle of prior appropriation. Iraqi 
authorities claim that Iraq has acquired rights relating to its ancestral irrigations on the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers.66  
Syrian authorities also base their arguments on the principle of prior 
appropriation asserting that Syria has possessed acquired rights dating from antique 
periods over the rivers that pass thorough Syrian territory. The second Syrian argument 
                                                 
64 The Helsinki Rules on the uses of the Waters of International Rivers adopted by the International Law 
Association at the fifty-second conference, held at Helsinki in August 1966. 
65 International Law Association, “Report of the Committee on the Uses of the Waters of International 
Rivers.” [http://www.internationalwaterlaw. org/IntlDocs/Helsinki_Rules.htm]. December 2002.  
 
66 Amir Sabbur, Report on Recent Syria – Iraq Talks on Water sharing, Damascus al-Thawrah, October 
1997, p. 12 (Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information service). 
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over its rights on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers has its roots in the principle of absolute 
territorial integrity. According to Syrian claims, the waters of those rivers must be shared 
among the riparian states according to the quota to be determined. 
In response to those arguments of the lower riparian states, Turkey holds to 
Article V of the UN Convention, claiming that it is using the waters of the Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers equitably and reasonably. Although the Harmon Doctrine of absolute 
sovereignty supports Turkey’s position as an upper stream state, Turkey favors 
negotiating the issue with Syria and Iraq. 
There are several reasons for the failure to find a solution in the basin in terms 
of International Law. First, these rules are not applicable to every specific case. Second, 
there is no legal enforcement mechanism that will provide the UN with the ability to 
control the behaviors of the riparian states. The last factor is the ambiguity between the 
articles. The articles provide both upper stream and down stream states with enough legal 
rights to defend their own arguments. 
B.        WHY WATER IS SO IMPORTANT FOR EACH COUNTRY? 
For reasons explained above, the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers present complex 
relations between the shared owners and users of the two rivers, while creating some 
concerns. Due to these complex relations, the riparian states are strategically positioned 
between two main areas of concern, which are those of domestic politics domestic 




 Turkey’s political concern is its efforts to increase the living standards in the 
southeast region of the country, which have been heavily inhabited by Turkish 
citizens of Kurdish ethnic origin. This basically shapes Turkey’s economic 
calculation for the continued development of its agricultural and industrial 
base. Additionally, the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers’ water is a critical 
consideration for the country’s increasing demand. 
 The Syrian government’s concern is to subjugate the Sunni-Muslims in order 
to provide stability and sustain their loyalty to the regime in the country, since  
power belongs to an Alawi minority. Syria has an agriculture-based economy, 
heavily dependent on Euphrates water for irrigation and hydro energy 
production. The direct link among water, food, and economic expansion is of 
vital importance for the Syrian government to be successful at providing 
stability within the country. 
 Parallel to Syrian concern, Saddam’s concern is to dominate Shi’ite Arabs and 
Sunni Kurds, to consolidate his regime, and to increase the possibilities of his 
survival. Economically, Iraq needs the basin’s water for its irrigation needs 
and energy production.67  
1.    Turkey 
Contrary to the prevailing belief, Turkey is not a water rich country. Although 
Turkey has at present more water resources than some of its neighbors, it is a country 
which will find itself unable to meet its own needs in the near future because Turkey's 
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average annual runoff is about 186 billion cubic meters (Bm3).68 The amount available 
for consumption of Turkey’s capacity is merely 110 Bm3, including 12 Bm3 of 
groundwater.69  
In total there are 26 major hydrologic basins in Turkey, however, Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers’ basin contains the largest volume among the others. These two rivers 
comprise nearly one-third of the nation’s total surface flow: 17 percent from the 
Euphrates and 11.5 percent from the Tigris.70 Under these considerations, Turkey’s 
economic and political concerns follow.    
a.  Domestic Economic Concerns  
      Turkey’s development strategy during the 1950s and 1960s aimed at fostering 
agricultural and industrial production, improving infrastructure, and establishing a market 
economy. The implementation of such strategy resulted in steady and substantial growth 
while increasing Turkey’s dependence on national resources, such as water. Two major 
domestic economic concerns have basically shaped the Turkish water policy in the basin.  
The first concern is that Turkey perceives the water resources as a source for 
irrigation since its economic development focused on agriculture. Turkey, as is evident 
from its being one of the few countries in the world that is self-sufficient in food, has 
given priority to agricultural development since the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923. Despite the rapid industrialization in the 1980s, agriculture maintains 
its importance in the overall picture of the Turkish economy. To expand its irrigated 
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lands to improve its agricultural production, Turkey initiated many water projects to 
control its water and to provide for its agriculture. Among these projects, the most 
important and most problematic one is the Southern Anatolia Project or Guneydogu 
Anadolu Projesi (GAP, the Turkish acronym). GAP is a $32 billion network of 22-dams 
and 19 hydroelectric projects that is designed to bring electricity and irrigation water to 
the poor southeast and cover one-fourth of Turkey's future electricity needs.  
 The second concern views water resources as a means for cheaper and 
domestically produced energy in order to provide an industrialized economy. The 
demand for electricity began to exceed supply and by the late 1970s the power shortage 
began to constrain industry. More importantly, Turkey's electricity demand is growing 
rapidly at an 8%  increase on average for many years.71 To meet the demand and the 
energy crises, the Turkish government has tried a number of strategies.  
Given the country’s geographical situation-it is endowed with rainfall and 
mountain catchment areas, which provides good hydropower potential-Turkish policy 
makers focused on hydro electrical resources with the aim of rapid development. The 
main objective of this policy is to meet the increasing demand for energy, in line with 
economic development targets, population growth rate, transition to industrialization and 
social changes, in a timely, reliable, inexpensive, high quality manner, while taking the 
environment into account. In this regard, the projects were initiated and dams, 
hydroelectric power plants, and other water related facilities were built to produce energy 
all around the country. As a result, the share of electric production from hydroelectric 
power plants in total production increased considerably (see Table - 4). 
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Table 472: Turkey’s Electric Production and Consumption (2000) 
 Percentage OECD Ranking 
Electricity production, share of fossil fuel  74.1% Rank: 10 
Electricity production, share of hydro  25.7% Rank:  9 
Electricity production, share of nuclear  0.00% Rank: 18 
Electricity production           :     119.2 billion kWh  





b.  Domestic Political Concerns 
      The domestic political rationale behind the Turkish water policy and its 
determination about the GAP project has two dimensions that are intrinsically related.73  
The first dimension is national security and the integration of the southeast 
part of Turkey into the rest of the country. It is geared toward ensuring a stable and 
dependable domestic constituency base on strategic international interaction, especially 
with the neighboring states.  
The second dimension, which focuses more directly on the internal political 
struggle among competing parties, is the political potential that the basin’s region offers 
parties in order to mobilize electoral support for their position in Turkey. 
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   1.  National Security Concerns: The main issue involving water  as a 
national security concern derives from the fact that the southeast region has been one of 
the nation’s least developed regions. The backwardness of the region became an 
emphatic topic of national security when the Kurdish terrorist group called PKK emerged 
in the early 1980s. The PKK has tried to use the low living standards in the region to 
justify and to impose its separatist goals directed against the inhabitants and the 
government facilities in the area.  
Turkish policy makers became more concerned with security when Syria 
began supporting the PKK activities in the Turkish provinces. Once the development of 
the region was perceived as the key to eliminating economic disparities with other parts 
of the country, the GAP was considered as the solution to the region's threat to national 
security and integrity. 
  2. Political Potential: Given the low Gross National Product—
population and human development index values—an investment in the southeast is more 
easily translatable to votes when compared with the other regions. That is why all parties 
are keen to mobilize political support in the region, which explains the unquestioned 
commitment to the GAP.  
2.     Syria 
Water is a scarce resource in Syria as it is throughout the Middle East. Along the 
western coastal mountain range Syria's climate is very Mediterranean; however, there is a 
long dry season from May to October. More than half of the Syrian territories are desert 
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with less than 250 mm of rainfall per year.74 Therefore, the countries fresh water 
resources are of vital importance to irrigation, industrial purposes and daily consumption. 
Syria is divided by seven water basins having different volumes of surface and 
underground water resources. There are 16 main rivers and tributaries in the country. 
Among these rivers Syria is mainly dependent on the Euphrates and to a smaller extent 
on the Tygris, Orontes, and Yarmouk rivers. The Euphrates accounts for as much as 86 
percent of the water available to the country.75 Under these considerations, a 
summarization of Syria’s economic and political concerns follows. 
a.   Domestic Political Concerns 
Syria’s political concerns regarding the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers can be 
explained as two interrelated reasons: 
First, since the Euphrates originates from Turkey, Syria does not want to be 
dependent on Turkey for food supply and water flow. As a result, Syria sees the water 
issue as a threat to its national security. According to Syrian policy makers, if the national 
security of the state of Syria is jeopardized, the very existence of the elite dominated 
regime itself will also be in danger. Thus, to secure its own position in the country and to 
defend the national security of Syria, the government has to use Euphrates water for its 
agricultural development, industrial needs, and electric production. 
Additionally, Syria does not want Turkey to have an advantage over the water 
issue because Syria fears that Turkey may use its advantageous position as a political 
weapon in the region to employ power politics schemes for hegemonic reasons. In this 
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struggle of self-sufficiency, the Syrian government views the fresh water resources as one 
of the most important strategic assets. Moreover, by using the water resources efficiently, 
the regime hopes to be able to dominate the politics in the region and lead the Arab 
World while establishing the Greater Syria.76 
Secondly, Syria has a lot of different ethnic and religious minorities. 
Estimated 85 percent of population adheres to some form of Islam: about 13 to 15 percent 
of Muslims are Alawis; less than 1 percent, Shias; and remainder, Sunnis.77 About 10 
percent of population observes some form of Christianity, and about 3 percent are 
Druzes, small numbers of Jews, Yazidis, and others.78 The ethnic structure of the Syrian 
society is as various as the religious structure.79 Most of the population (90%) is Arab.80 
Minorities include the Kurds (mostly in the northern farm regions) and Armenians (in the 
northern cities). There are also communities of Palestinians in Damascus and a 
community of Tcherkas from the Caucus.  
Because of these religious and ethnic complexities, the consciousness of a 
Syrian nationality is not well developed. This effort of forming a Syrian nationality, or at 
least keeping those different cultures together under the name of the state of Syria, has 
become a more difficult task because the Syrian regime itself is Alawi dominated—a  
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minority group. By contrast, among both Arabs and minority groups, primary individual 
loyalty is to the local ethnic or religious community rather than the government itself.  
Thus, to neutralize the dissatisfaction of the other ethnic and religious groups and to keep 
their loyalties to the regime, the Syrian government has to satisfy the demands of all 
groups. The Syrian government knows that: 
 In economic life, the satisfaction of all groups has been directly related to 
the water resources of the country since the Syrian economy depends 
mostly on agriculture.   
 Any failure in maintaining the flow of the Euphrates, and to a lesser extent 
the Tigris River, may deteriorate the living standards of the various 
groups, thus threatening the survivability of the Syrian government.  
Because of the delicate positions of ethnic and religious groups and their 
economic reliance on the fresh water resources, the Syrian regime has always tried to get 
the maximum share from the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers to sustain the economic well 
being and loyalties of those groups to the government. 
b.   Domestic Economic Concerns 
The Syrian economic concerns along the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers are 
more or less the same as Turkey’s concerns. The first of those concerns is Syria's need for 
water in agriculture, and the second is the need to harness the hydroelectric potential of 
these rivers. 
Syria is primarily an agricultural country. Agriculture remains a vital sector of 
the Syrian economy, supplying necessary products for the industrial sector and 
employing over 25% of the labor force. For instance, in 1992, the agriculture sector 
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captured 29.8% of GDP; a 10% increase over 1970.81 Since agriculture is still the main 
economic activity and a major source of income (See Table 5), the economic 
development of the country greatly depends on the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris 
Rivers. For instance, the irrigated area by the Euphrates produces over 50% of the total 
value of agricultural production.  
Table 582: Syrian GDP - Composition by Sector and Labor Force by 
Occupation 
SECTOR GDP – Composition (2000) Labor force-by occupation(1996)
Agriculture 27% 40% 
Industry 23% 20% 
Services 50% 40% 
 
Syrian also needs the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers for hydroelectric power. 
In the past, the Syrian energy and power sectors have made no efforts to manage the 
Syrian power system and renewable energy resources to meet energy demands. As a first 
energy source Syria has oil. In the 1950s, Syria began to use oil resources. Oil 
consumption doubled between 1960 and 1970 and has played a vital role in the Syrian 
economy by generating much needed foreign exchange and by meeting the country’s 
increasing energy demands. Using oil revenue, the Syrian government built new dams, 
increased the generating capacity of the hydroelectric power plants and expanded the 
electricity production (see Table 6).  
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        Table 683: Syrian Electricity consumption and production 
SYRIA (2000) Percentage 
Electricity production, share of fossil fuel  64% 
Electricity production, share of hydro  36% 
Electricity production, share of nuclear   0% 
 
The first national energy policy was launched in 1974. The predominant 
energy and electric power supply policy pursued in Syria is based on meeting demand 
through the expansion of conventional electric production capacity. Although the electric 
power industry was one of the fastest growing sectors of the economy in the early 1980s, 
this did not last long.  By 1985 electricity consumption outstripped production, which 
forced power cutbacks of four hours a day throughout the country. This affected the 
countriy’s economy negatively.84 Declining water levels in dams, because of the drought 
years, and the increasing electricity consumption resulted in shortage of electricity all 
around the country during the 1990s. Since these shortages in electricity have impeded 
economic growth and industrial development in Syria, the Syrian Government needs to 
maintain high volumes in the Euphrates. The high volume would enable the dams and 
power plants to operate at maximum capacity, thus solving the electricity problem 
throughout the country. 
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3.     Iraq 
The prevalent climate in Iraq is mainly subtropical and semi-arid. The average 
temperatures in Iraq range from higher than 48 degree C (120 Fahrenheit) in July and 
August to below freezing in January.85 The Iraqi climate is similar to that of the extreme 
southwestern United States with hot, dry summers, cold winters, and a pleasant spring 
and fall.  Roughly 90% of the annual rainfall occurs between November and April, most 
of it in the winter months from December through March.86 
Under these hard climatic conditions, Iraq needs extensive water resources to 
maintain its economic and industrial development. When compared with the other states 
in the region, however, Iraq has more fresh water resources than most of the Middle 
Eastern countries. Nevertheless, as a result of the neglect and bad management of the 
irrigation networks and the environmental degradation, the water potential of Iraq has 
deteriorated and the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris have gained much more 
importance than ever for the Iraqi government both economically and politically.  
a.   Domestic Political Concerns 
The domestic political concerns of Iraq over the water issue parallel Turkey’s 
and especially Syria’s concerns. These concerns are related directly to the national 
security of Iraq. Like the Syrian example, the link between the water issue and the 
national security of Iraq derives from two reasons: 
First, the governmental structure of Iraq is one in which the functions of the 
elite, the regime, and the state overlap to the point of being indistinguishable. In this 
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ambiguous structure of government, any challenges to the elite dominance are perceived 
as a threat to national security.   If the national security of the state of Iraq was 
jeopardized, then the very existence of the regime itself would also be in danger. So, in 
order to secure its own position in the country and to defend the national security of Iraq, 
Saddam's Regime needed to exploit basin’s water effectively. Since the water resources 
were of critical urgency to Iraq’s agriculture and economy, any failure in maintaining the 
flow of the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers threaten the regime’s survivability, which is 
already questionable.  
In addition to these facts, the Saddam regime tries to lead the Arab World and 
dominate the politics in the Middle East. Under these circumstances, Iraq perceives the 
Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers as highly strategic resources to be maintained and tries to 
secure the maximum benefit from those resources. 
Second, Iraq is not a homogenous nation-state (See Table 7). Ethnically and 
religiously diversified, Iraqi society has made it rather difficult for Saddam's ruling 
minority (See Table 8), which was Sunni Muslim, to gain support from other ethno-
religious groups inside the country.87 Many of the Shi’as reside in the Euphrates and 
Tigris basin in southern Iraq and benefit from the irrigation schemes and the agricultural 
production, any loss to the flow of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers would degrade the 
living conditions of the Shi’as. Subsequently, the degradation of living conditions in the 
Euphrates-Tigris basin in southern Iraq would be a good justification for the Shi’ite 
community to oppose the government in order to end the Sunni Muslim domination in the 
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country. As a result, to maintain the stability of the regime in the country, Saddam has to 
maintain and even increase the amount of water that it uses from this basin.  
Table 788 : Iraq’s Ethnic Groups 
Arab %75-80 
Kurdish %15-20 
Turkoman, Assyrian or other %5 
Total Population: 24,001,816 (July 2002 est.) 
    
                                     Table 889: Religions in Iraq 
Sunni 32-37% MUSLIM 
Shi’a 60-65% 
97% 
Christian or other 3% 
 
b.   Domestic Economic Concerns 
Two factors can be examined when considering the domestic economic 
concerns of Iraq over the use of the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers.  
     The first area which puts the two rivers into the top priority list of the Iraqi 
government is the irrigation potential of the rivers for developing agriculture and the 






domestic use of these fresh water resources by the rapidly increasing urban population 
Another factor that increased the importance of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers for the 
Iraqi government is the August 1990 United Nations’ trade embargo.  A side effect of this 
embargo may be to impel Baghdad to seek total food security within its territory in the 
future. This situation places more demand on the Iraqi water resources, especially 
Euphrates-Tigris River Basin water.  
The second area is the hydroelectric energy that can be produced by using the 
Euphrates and Tigris. Iraqi electric consumption increased by a factor of fourteen 
between 1968 and 1988, and it was expected to double every four to five years in the late 
1990s.90 Ongoing rural electrification, which included about 7,000 villages throughout 
the country, contributed to this increased demand.91 Iraq’s increasing electric needs 
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IV. IS THERE A HYDROPOLITICAL CONFLICT IN  
THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS BASIN? 
A.        INTRODUCTION: 
Since 6000 BCE, successive civilizations that settled and flourished in 
Mesopotamia (the land between the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers) have had an 
engineering approach to water related management, which is essentially concerned with 
supply augmentation and satisfaction of demand for water rather than demand 
management.92 Because of the climatic condition of the region and hydrography of the 
basin discussed in Chapter III, at the early stages of settlement, villagers learned to 
cooperate to build ditches93 to solve their irrigation problem.  
In Mesopotamia, the political, social and economic structures of the old 
civilizations were mostly dependent on well-developed and well-maintained hydro-
agricultural system. These needs were reflected in the Code of Hammurabi, which 
established water laws and rules for maintaining irrigation projects94 through large-scale 
cooperation. Therefore, it reflects that Mesopotamian civilization not only had enough 
engineering skill, but also had well-established civil institutions to solve their water 
problem  so as to successfully sustain some 20 million inhabitants. 
The old civilizations that lived in Mesopotamia had the social prowess and well-
established legal institutions required for maintaining the functionality of their organized 
water system and for preventing conflict. For example, the code of Hammurabi in 
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eighteenth century BCE, and the Islamic Law in the Medieval Era, are elaborate sets of 
principles to regulate water management and to abate conflict. 
The Ottoman Empire was the last and biggest civilization to control the 
Mesopotamia region as a whole. During its reign, Ottoman Turks repaired the hydraulic 
system and relative prosperity came back to region again after a long history of invasion. 
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, however, the entire Middle East drastically 
changed. This event opened a new page in the history of Mesopotamia, the division of the 
Euphrates–Tigris basin between tree parties—Turkey, Syria, and Iraq—was  one of the 
important consequences of this dissolution. Subsequently hydro politics gradually 
became a major international issue in Mesopotamia and Middle East. 
However, until 1975, neither the absence of integrated planning or the entire basin 
nor the lack of comprehensive agreement among three riparian countries on a water-
sharing regime, led to any international friction among them,95 because of the relative 
abundance of water in the basin which could satisfy all parties. The relative abundance of 
water in the basin also did not prevent the riparian countries of the basin from conducting 
some bilateral or trilateral negotiations. As a result, three riparian parties facilitated a 
peaceful course of development in the region. Even in this period, the projects 
implemented by parties didn’t cause a significant controversy. This cooperative mode of 
conduct has often been overlooked by Western commentators who incline towards 
conflict-oriented scenarios.96  
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For instance, late in 1993, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued a report 
pinpointing ten regions around the world it believed would witness conflicts over one of 
the basic source of life, water. Additionally, most of them were in the Middle East where 
the water is blue gold because of its scarcity. Crises have already begun to emerge in the 
region in the Jordan River Basin between Israel, Palestine, and Jordan; among Egypt, 
Sudan and Ethiopia over the Nile River; and to some extent between Turkey and Syria 
over the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.  
Problems about the use of the water resources in the Euphrates-Tigris basin began 
in the early 1970s with the large-scale Turkish and Syrian irrigation and hydropower 
projects on the Euphrates, and to a lesser extent on the Tigris River. Since the early 
1970s, there have been many important tensions in this region concerning water between 
these riparian countries. As a result, in 1992, a Pentagon Report identified a water war 
between Syria and Turkey as one of the first contingencies next to the Jordan River in 
Middle East.97  
The mindset of scholars about water scarcity as a sole source of conflict was too 
narrow as explained in Chapter II. Some of the most interesting, and compelling 
examples of water-related conflicts were a function of the relationships among social, 
political, and economic factors, including economic development.98 In addition to this, 
water was used as a political and military weapon in many conflicts caused by other 
factors than access to the water. 
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Over the past twenty years much has been written and said about the impending 
water wars that can be expected in semi-arid and arid regions across the globe in the 
twenty-first century. It was made popular by former UN Secretary General Boutros-
Ghali’s statement that: “The next war in the Middle East will not be over politics but over 
water.”99 On the contrary, precisely because water is so essential to life, even hostile co-
riparian countries have historically sought to compromise rather go to war over water, 
even as disputes have raged on other issues.100 Indeed, the historical record is 
predominantly of water acting as a catalyst for cooperation rather than conflict. Whether 
at the local level or internationally, the vast majority of societies have successfully sought 
to evolve subtle, often-unwritten, rules for collaboratively managing shared water 
resources for the common good. 101  
Parallel to this idea, some writers such as Gleick argue that in the Euphrates and 
Tigris Rivers’ Basin “the need to manage jointly the shared water resources of the region 
may provide an unprecedented opportunity to move toward an era of cooperation and 
peace.”102 In next two chapters, I will support Gleick’s argument that the conflicting 
representation of hydro politics in the region is unconvincing, because of five main 
reasons: 
1. The three riparian countries have been engaged in continuous technical 
consultations and political negotiations over water since the early 1960s.  This 
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shows their effort to avoid water conflict. As a result there are many treaties, 
which have been signed by three riparian countries that lessen the strength of 
a water scarcity issue in the politic arena.  
2. There are some norms that countries follow while using the basin’s water. 
3. There are many other reasons that create tension in the region, other than 
water.  
4. Three riparian countries have initiated many projects to capture, store, and 
redirect freshwater resources in efforts to reduce their vulnerability. These 
expensive projects increased the probability of cooperation in the basin. Major 
water problems arise primarily from the mode of water allocation within states 
rather than to water allocation between states. 
5. In the Euphrates–Tigris Basin, none of the riparian countries is facing an 
imminent water shortage. They purposefully exaggerate the water scarcity that 
dictates the political behaviors regarding the basin because each riparian 
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B.        WATER-RELATED AGREEMENTS BETWEEN TURKEY, SYRIA AND 
IRAQ:  
Since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the three parties generally 
pursued a cooperative policy, as mentioned above, to determine the best mechanism for 
the optimal management of the basin’s water. Three riparian countries of the Euphrates 
and the Tigris Rivers have achieved this with the help of the regulatory framework that 
they have decided in international water-related agreements. However, because of the 
ignorance of this regulatory framework by western strategists, they gradually exemplified 
the lack of cooperation that led them to create scenarios about the water wars in this 
basin. There are two distinct phases in the growth of water resources management in 
modern Mesopotamia.103  
1.   The First Phase (after the dissolution of Ottoman Empire to 1960) 
During this phase, there are no signs of water conflict; the main approach to 
water resources management is an engineering approach and water is being used only for 
irrigation not for energy production. The conclusions of treaties are clear indicators of the 
dominance of a cooperative mode of relations between three parties. 
The first international agreement was in the Franco-British Convention of 
1920, according to which the mandatory powers agreed to establish a committee to 
examine and coordinate the water utilization of the Euphrates and Tigris.104 There also is 
a Franco-Turkish agreement in 1921, which is concerned with the upstream utilization of 
the waters of the Koveik River. Although this river is not related to the Euphrates–Tigris 
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Basin, it clearly shows that the three parties have been trying to solve their problem  
satisfactorily for all concerned. Additionally, this agreement can be used as an example 
for the upstream-downstream water use problem, which is now the basic issue in the 
basin. 
In 1923, the downstream parties’ rights were reflected in the Treaty of 
Lausanne, which noted that Turkey should confer with Iraq before beginning any 
activities that may alter the flow of the Euphrates.105 Additionally, on May 30, 1926 the 
Friendship and Neighborly Relations Convention was signed between Turkey and Syria, 
and in 1930 the Treaty of Aleppo referred briefly to Syrian water rights on the Tigris. 
After WWII, Iraq and Turkey began exchanging information for providing 
satisfactory flood. Since there was an extreme seasonal and annual variance, it was 
recognized that the optimal water management mechanism for the Euphrates–Tigris 
Rivers had to be implemented in upstream areas for food security and regular flooding. 
Clearly, if either Turkey or Iraq had perceived water management to be a strategic issue, 
such a mutual understanding would have been impossible.106 Subsequently, a treaty of 
Friendship and Good Neighborly Relations was signed in 1946 between Turkey and Iraq. 
Additionally, they signed another protocol, together with this treaty. This protocol 
indicates that Turkey and Iraq perceived the water issue as a technical and engineering 
matter which required collaboration between them. Its principal objective was the 
construction of protection and observation posts on Turkish territory to prevent 
downstream flooding. Accordingly, the cost of all installations, preliminary research 
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works, and exchange of information were to be borne by Iraq, but the maintenance costs 
were to be shared by both parties.107 
Although there was not a comprehensive international treaty between the three 
riparian countries during this period, the fruitful bilateral negotiations and agreements 
worked well and shaped the general principals regarding downstream countries’ rights 
and water usage for irrigation in the basin. Additionally, these bilateral agreements could 
serve as a more extensive cooperation between the riparian parties. It must be 
emphasized, however, that cooperation over broad joint projects was still very limited in 
this period, because of the regional political obstacles and there was ample water in the 
basin. 
Until mid-1970s Turkey used only 3% of the Euphrates water, Syria near 
10%, and Iraq slightly more than 50%.108 Including the much less-developed water 
resources of the Tigris River, it is clear that the Euphrates-Tigris system had substantial 
water left after current demands were met in all riparian countries.109    
2.  The Second Phase (1960 and onwards) 
The water resources situation in the basin started to change in the 1960s, when 
all riparian countries initiated their large-scale exploitation projects. Especially during the 
early 1960s, Turkey and Syria started to draw up plans for large-scale water management 
projects on Euphrates and, to a lesser extent, on Tigris. Iraq, the main user of water in the 
basin, saw these projects as a strategic challenge to its position, while perceiving that 
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Turkey and Syria were determined to raise their shares in the basin. The three parties 
came together for the first time in the mid-1960s to discuss the possibility of dividing the 
water resources in the basin. 
For negotiation purposes, each country made maximum demands about its 
share of water in the basin. Since the total of these demands was roughly one-and-a-half 
times the average flow of the river, no agreement was reached. After this first 
unsuccessful trilateral attempt, Syria and Iraq carried on bilateral meetings. Iraq wanted a 
fixed amount of the river’s flow. In response to the Iraqi demand, Syria wanted a 
balanced allocation of the Euphrates water, but in the end no agreement was signed 
between them. 
The failure of the parties to reach a comprehensive agreement caused each 
party to focus on its own development plans on the portions of the rivers in its territory. 
Since then, a strategic importance has been given to the water in the basin and Turkey, 
Syria, and Iraq have had ambitious plans for exploiting it. As a result, observers 
repeatedly warned that this basin is  a time bomb that could explode anytime.  
Tensions increased between Iraq and Syria when Syria began to fill the 
reservoirs of the Tabqa Dam in 1975. In early 1975, Iraq complained that Syria had 
caused great economic damage to Iraq by reducing the flow of the Euphrates River. With 
the escalation of the tension, the two regimes traded accusations unrelated to the water 
issue, and Syria began to openly support Iraqi Kurdish dissidents. Then the two countries 
closed each other’s airline offices and airspace, and sent troops to their borders in April 
1975. Through the mediation of Saudi Arabia and the former Soviet Union, the crisis was 
solved before an armed conflict between the two states ensued. 
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They made an agreement: Syria would keep 40% of the water and would 
allow 60% to pass through to Iraq. A dispute or military conflict that involves natural 
resources is not necessarily a struggle over such resources.  It also can be a contest for 
ideological or hegemonic supremacy in a region, as the 1975 Euphrates crisis between 
Iraq and Syria illustrated. 
In 1980, Turkey and Iraq established the Joint Technical Committee to 
continue efforts to reach a solution that would satisfy the needs of the riparian states in 
the basin. Syria entered this group in 1983, and this tripartite committee began its work 
on the basis of exchanging information about the two rivers. Turkey offered a "Three-
Staged Plan for Optimum, Equitable, and Reasonable Utilization of the Basin." This plan 
was first introduced during the fifth meeting of the Joint Technical Committee  in 
November 1984. This plan proposed three stages:  
 First Stage: It involved “Inventory Studies for Water Resources” where all 
sides exchanged data on gauging stations, flows and quality of water. 
 Second Stage: It referred to the “Inventory Studies for Land Resources,” 
where data on land classification, soil conditions for projects that are 
planned and/or under construction and operation, and drainage conditions 
are all exchanged among the three riparian states. 
 Third Stage:  The “Evaluation of Water and Land Resources,” which 
includes activities that range from determining optimal irrigation types to 
determining water consumption and evaluating the economic viability of 
the planned project. 
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The Turkish side suggested that an equitable, rational and optimum utilization 
of water could be achieved through a scientific study which would determine the true 
water needs of each riparian country. Iraq and Syria have both perceived this proposal as 
an infringement in their domestic affairs. Furthermore, when Turkey initiated the GAP 
Project in the mid-1980s, Syria and Iraq saw it as a threat to their economic and strategic 
goals.  As a result the three riparian countries started to give little importance to the Joint 
Technical Committee and projects could never be initiated. Nevertheless, the role of the 
Joint Technical Committee should not be underestimated. “Although its meetings are 
infrequent and appear to have made little substantive progress on the question of water 
sharing, it is useful channel for communication.”110  
In mid 1980s, Turkish Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal offered a “Peace Pipeline”  
project (see Figure 8) to Middle East countries that would transport water from two 
western Turkish rivers, the Seyhan and Ceyhan, southward to Syria, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, and the other Gulf States. At the same time the Peace Pipeline project has been 
trumpeted by the Turkish government as one of the best hopes for lasting peace in the 
Middle East region because, if fully implemented, it could effectively end regional states’ 
competition and anxiety over water. It is for this reason that the Turkish government 
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The Peace Pipeline is a technically, financially, and ecologically feasible 
project.   It would provide 8 to 9 million people with up to 400 liters of water per person 
per day through two pipelines--the Western Pipeline and the Gulf Pipeline (See Figure 
8).112 The project, however, has not been so warmly received by several states in the 
region, partly because of its high estimated cost of $21 billion and of the projected length 
of time (ten years) needed for the operation of the pipeline.113 The most important 
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concern is that the pipeline, as currently conceived, would pass through a number of 
downstream countries that do not trust each other. Moreover, the downstream Arab states 
felt that initiation of this project would mean accepting Turkey as a militarily, politically 
and hydrologically stronger upstream state in the region. Therefore, The Peace Pipeline 
project was emphatically rejected by all Arab states. Nevertheless, as Kolars 
acknowledges, it should not be forgotten that Turkey’s proposal of a "Peace Pipeline" 
was an important cooperative gesture, which may become part of the milieu in which 
future river management efforts will be forged.114 
In 1986 Syrian's Prime Minister visited Turkey and for the first time the 
Syrians publicly linked security and water saying, “They would not sign a security 
agreement unless Turkey entered into a formal water agreement.”115 In July 1987, Turgut 
Ozal, the Turkish Prime Minister, visited Damascus. At this meeting, Turkey and Syria 
signed a Protocol of Economic Cooperation covering a wide range of issues. Water was 
one of them. Turkey promised to maintain the Euphrates flow of 500 m3/sec across the 
Syrian border—this  was its second retreat from its initial position on the Euphrates since 
1964. There are three important articles about Euphrates water in this protocol for 
guaranteed minimum Euphrates flows in return for Syrian cooperation on border security: 
 Article 6: During the filling up period of the Ataturk dam reservoir, and 
until the final allocation of the waters of the Euphrates among the three 
riparian countries, the Turkish side undertakes to release a yearly average 
of more than 500 cubic meters per second at the Turkish–Syrian border. In 
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cases where the monthly flow falls below the level of 500m3/sec, the 
Turkish side agrees to make up the difference during the following month. 
 Article 7: States that Turkey and Syria should work together with Iraq to 
allocate Tigris and Euphrates waters within the shortest possible time. 
 Article 9: Under this article both states agreed in principal to construct and 
jointly operate irrigation projects.116 
The Protocol was regarded as a temporary arrangement. This commitment 
was repeatedly confirmed by Turkey, however, and finally, in 1994, an agreement was 
signed to supply Syria’s water requirements in return for Syrian assurance of cooperation 
on the Kurdish problem. 
The second crisis occurred when Turkey finished the Ataturk Dam in 1990. 
This interrupted the flow of the Euphrates for a month, partly to fill the reservoir. Despite 
an advanced warning from Turkey, as well as being given more water before and after the 
temporary cutoff of the river's water, it created high tension over the downstream flow. 
Syria and Iraq both protested that Turkey now possessed a water weapon that could be 
used against them. Syria complained that only one out of eight 100-MW turbines was 
functioning on the Tabqa dam.  Iraq claimed that the proposed reduction in the Euphrates 
flow would damage irrigation schemes and shut down power plants which produced 40% 
of the countries electricity.117 Turkey, however, argued that Syria would receive a 
minimum flow of 120 m3/sec from tributaries below the Ataturk dam, as well as 
additional flows at a rate of 750 m3/sec from 23 November to 13 January (Euphrates 
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discharge into Syria averaged 768m3/sec in this period, so during this and the impounding 
period the average flow would be 509 m3/sec within the terms of the 1987 protocol).118 
The Ataturk Dam crisis caused an unprecedented degree of Syrian-Iraqi unity 
over the Euphrates. On 16 April 1990, at the Secretariat of the Arab League, which was 
then located in Tunis, the two states signed an agreement. According to this agreement, 
whatever the volume of the river that crossed the Turkish-Syrian border was, Syria would 
keep 42% of the water for itself and would allow 58% of that quantity to cross its border 
to Iraq. The Syrian-Iraqi united front against Turkey was very short lived and finally 
collapsed when Syria opposed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. However, 
Syria still keeps 42% of the water for itself and allows the remainder to cross to Iraq. 
In 1995, a new crisis over water supplies developed between Turkey and 
Syria. After the credit agreement for the new Birecik Dam on the Euphrates River was 
reached, Syria immediately lobbied against Turkey both in the Arab League and in 
Western countries. At the same time, signs of a revival of the Syrian-Iraqi unity on the 
Euphrates reappeared. They accused Turkey of releasing contaminated water downstream 
to Syria. Turkey did not take these accusations seriously and reiterated its readiness to 
discuss all aspects of its projects on the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. Still no formal 
agreement has been reached regarding the allocation of water between these three 
countries. 
Nevertheless, consultations are continuing among the riparian countries in the 
Joint Technical Committee, a body that reflects a cooperative trend among tree riparian 
countries. This activity continues, and as a critical interchange, has also convinced them 
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that cooperation over the water issues is not necessary a zero-sum game but could be a 
win-win situation in which all parties would gain from cooperation.119 
Finally, despite some provocative rhetorical statements by some officials in 
the region and their sensationalist coverage by Western journalists, the most important 
water projects on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers were carried out peacefully during 
1970s and 1980s.Those which are still under construction are of far less significance.120 
This peaceful development course in the region happened mainly because the overall 
process of water resource development has been in accordance with previous agreements 
between the riparian countries--those mentioned  
C.     THREE RIPARIAN COUNTRIES FOLLOW SOME NORMS, WHILE 
USING THE BASIN’S WATER 
Water as the sum substance of life has affected the course of human history. Its 
abundance has enabled societies to prosper; its scarcity has caused them to become weak. 
Water is a central issue on the national agendas of all countries due to its linkages to 
national interest, demography, agricultural and economic development; and its multiple 
and varied uses for drinking and irrigation, generation of electricity, sanitation, tourism 
and leisure activities. The cultural meanings people attach to water, their evaluations of 
water quality and usage, and their responses to water issues and policies also affect the 
developments of water usage, because the cultural meanings and values encoded in water 
are extremely powerful, have proved immensely persistent over time, and continue to 
exert considerable influence upon all interactions with water.121 Therefore, this  section 
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will cover some existing national environmental values that Turkey, Syria and Iraq have 
pursued while following cooperative water management development.  
First, the ability of Turkey to shut off the flow of the Euphrates, even temporarily, 
was noted by political and military strategists at the beginning of the Persian Gulf 
conflict.  In the early days of the war, behind the scenes, there were discussions at the 
United Nations about using Turkish dams on the Euphrates River to deprive Iraq in 
response to its invasion of Kuwait. However, no such action was ever taken. 
Second, upper stream countries always tried to release more than the minimum 
amount of water that was regulated by treaties. For example, Turkey has been able to 
abide fully by the commitment it made in 1987 to release a yearly average of 500 cubic 
meters a second, summer and winter. In practice the flow often exceeds this considerably. 
In 1995, for example, the annual average flow was around 830 cubic meters a second. In 
the first half of 1996, Turkey has been releasing water to Syria at between 1,147 and 
1,684 cubic meters a second, far above the amount specified in the 1987 Protocol.122 
Additionally, Turkey has given 900 cubic meters of water per second on average to Syria 
over the last three years. 
When there was an unusual situation, as happened with the Ataturk Dam crisis, 
during one month, Turkey cut off the Euphrates water in order to fill its reservoir. 
However, Turkey warned the down stream countries and wanted them to store more 
water than usual before the cut off time. Moreover, Turkey released more water than 
usual before the cut off.  Additionally, Syria and Iraq made an agreement about sharing 
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water that Turkey was to release to Syrian territory. Whatever the volume of the river that 
crossed the Turkish-Syrian border was, Syria would keep 42% of the water for itself and 
would allow the 58% remaining to cross its border to Iraq. This historical information 
basically shows that upper stream countries never wanted to make down stream countries 
suffer from water scarcity and always released as much water as they could and did not 
use the water as a political weapon. 
D.       OTHER REASONS THAT CREATE TENSION IN THE EUPHRATES – 
TIGRIS RIVER BASIN  
The relationship among the three states is very intricate. They are connected not 
only by water rights but also by complex historical and political factors (See Figure 9).  
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In order to point out the complex relationships among the three riparian countries, 
Gleick said: 
For 30 years, negotiations over the Euphrates among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have 
produced no lasting agreement, in part because the three countries have long been 
at odds with each other. For example, Syria and Iraq have opposed Turkey over 
its membership in NATO, and Syria and Turkey opposed Iraqi military actions in 
the 1970s. In the 1980s, Turkey and Iraq tended to band together against Syrian 
military aggression, and Turkey and Syria sided with allied forces against Iraq 
during the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s.124 
 
Parallel to Gleick’s idea, Lowi said: 
There has been a need for a basin-wide agreement since the mid-1960s… There 
have been several unsuccessful attempts at promoting a tripartite accord... Syria 
and Turkey have a simmering territorial dispute concerning the Hatay that dates 
back to the Mandate period. In recent years, the two countries have been at odds 
over the Kurdish insurgency movement.125 
 
For Syria, the water issue was not only an issue itself; it also was a bargaining 
chip for negotiations with Turkey about the territorial dispute over the Hatay province. 
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, France took control of Hatay. The new 
independent Turkish state started to show its eagerness to take Hatay back since most of 
the population of Hatay consisted of Turks. Hatay had belonged to Turks for centuries. In 
1939, France transferred this region from Syria to Turkey, but Syria wants it back.  
Tension between Syria and Turkey is furthermore linked to the Kurds, who live in 
all three countries. The national security and stability of Turkey are vulnerable to Kurdish 
sedition and secession, while it is not posing a political threat to Syria due to their small 
number. Syria used this security leverage to encourage Turkey to take account of the 
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demands of its downstream neighbors, as a senior official of the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
said: 
It is true that Syria does have a habit of working through proxies. It was about 
1980 that we started talking seriously about expanding the GAP project, and it 
was about that time that Ocalan (the leader of PKK) began getting help from 
Damascus. You could make a connection.126 
 
Additionally, the relations between Iraq and Syria are also problematic. The main 
reason for this growing antagonism was the rivalry between Syria and Iraq. In the 1970s, 
the two regimes were competitors in the Arab world. They were trying to represent the 
Arab front separately and trying to dominate each other in the region. 
 Iraq's security problem is similar to Turkey's regarding the Kurds. More 
importantly, during the 1980s it was engaged in a war with Iran and later in Gulf War. As 
a result, water issues with Turkey were not one of its highest priorities. Especially during 
1980s and early 1990s, Iraq desperately needed to have a good relationship with Turkey, 
through whose territory its oil could reach the market. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, 
however, Turkey took sides in the conflict and joined the coalition formed against Iraq—
understandably resulting in tension between the two countries. Once the Gulf War was 
over, the two states returned to their former relationship.  
The balance of power in the region changed with the end of the Iran-Iraq war and 
particularly in the aftermath of the Gulf War. These developments had significant 
repercussions for the water dispute. First, the Kurdish problem had grown extremely 
complicated with the political and military rivalry over northern Iraq and the existence of 
a power vacuum there. The prospects of increasing attacks by the PKK from that front 
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raised serious security concerns for Turkey. While Turkey’s efforts to persuade Syria to 
not support PKK activities proved futile, Syria began to protest the building of the 
Birecik dam which started in 1992 as another piece of the GAP project. Despite repeated 
attempts to address the concerns of all parties with bilateral and trilateral talks, 
throughout the early 1990s, negotiations remained deadlocked. 
What needs to be underlined here is that the post-1984 period marked the 
escalation of the Kurdish problem and witnessed the internationalization of the Kurdish 
issue as Syria and Iran began to use the so-called "ethnic card." Hence, the escalation of 
the water dispute clearly corresponds to the escalation of the Kurdish problem and the 
increasing use of the "ethnic terror" card by Syria, and later by Iraq, as a bargaining chip. 
This suggests that the solution to the Kurdish problem is intrinsically linked to the 
resolution of the water dispute and that finding a solution to one without finding a 
solution to the other would be very difficult, if not impossible. 
These different views clearly show that the water conflict is the result of 
numerous complex causes, rather than an as an autonomous issue. Water is only one of 
the factors souring relations between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, states traditionally 
competing for regional leadership.127  Others issues to consider are territorial disputes 
over Hatay between Syria and Turkey, internal problems, domestic political situations of 
each country, the Kurdish problem and many other matters unrelated to water issues. 
Therefore, we cannot argue that the lack of cooperation between the riparian countries in 
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their hydro politics policies is a direct result of apparent or potential water shortages in 
the region.128  
E.        WATER PROJECTS IN THE EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS BASIN: 
Historically, a unitary authority mostly administered the Euphrates–Tigris basin. 
For instance, from the sixteenth century to the World War I, the region was under 
Ottoman rule. However, after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the geographical 
map of the whole Middle East changed drastically. For the first time hydro politics 
became an international issue between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Turkey, a new 
independent state, became upper riparian, while Syria and Iraq under French and British 
mandates became the lower riparian states. Iraq in 1932, and Syria in 1946, established 
their independence and started to exploit the basin’s water for their economic and 
industrial development. 
The water resource situation in the basin started to change in the 1960s when all 
riparian countries initiated their large-scale exploitation projects. Turkey and Syria 
started to draw up plans for large-scale water management projects on the Euphrates and, 
to a lesser extent, on the Tigris (See Figure 10). In the end, the three parties had built-up 
such a tremendous storage capacity, one far beyond their actual needs, that it reduced 
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1.   Iraq’s Dams and Lakes 
Iraq was the first of the three countries to seek ways to develop the waters of the 
Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. In 1977, the on-river dams, all of which are located in the 
Tigris river basin, had a total capacity of 13.7 km3. There was an important program of 
dam construction in Iraq in the 1980s (See Figure 11). Table 9130 shows the large extent 
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Table – 9: Iraq’s Water Projects 
Projects River Storage capacity Purpose 
Habbaniya Lake - 32 billion m3 Flood control, irrigation in the dry 
season 
Abu Dibis Lake 
and Barrage 
E 32 billion m3 Flood control, irrigation in the dry 
season 
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Hindiya Barrage E - Raising water to feed the Hilla, 
Musaib, Elhosaniye, and Beni 
Hassen canals 
Diyala Barrage Diyala - Divrsion of water to irrigation 
canals 
Kut Barrage T - Diversion of water to shatt el 
Jaref 
Lake Tharthar T 30 billion m3 To prevents floods in Tigris, 
transfer from Tigris to Euphrates 
Ramadi Barrage E - Flood control and direct water to 
Habbaniye lake 
Samara Barrage T - Diversion of water to Lake 
Tharthar 
Falluja Barrage E - Diversion of water to irrigation 
canals 
Dokan Dam Little Zab 0.63 – 0.75 
billion m3 
400 MW hydropower, water 
storage, and irrigation 
Darbandikhan 
Dam 
Diyala 5 billion m3 Hydropower, flood control, and 
storage 
Kadisiya Dam E 17 billion m3 600MW hydropower, storage, 
and irrigation 
76 
Saddam Dam T 30 billion m3 750 MW hydropower, storage, 
and irrigation 
Batama Dam Little Zab - Hydropower and storage 
 
By the mid 1960s, Iraq was irrigating over five times as much land as Syria and 
nearly ten times as much as Turkey.132 In order to continue its efforts to use the basin’s 
water more efficiently, Iraq began constructing the “Third River” (see Figure 12133) 
between the Euphrates and Tigris in the 1960s. In the late 1970s, as part of the effort to 
prevent flood damage, Iraq built another canal to divert excess water from the Tigris into 
Lake Thartar. Since then, Iraq has continued to build other similar canals linking two 
rivers with Lake Thartar, Lake Habbaniya, and Lake Abu Dibis to prevent flooding in the 
low lying areas of Baghdad. 
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Figure 12: Third River: 
In December 1992, the 
Iraqis celebrated the 
inauguration of a 565 
km-long navigable 
cannel, which flows 
midway between the 
Euphrates and Tigris –
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One of the striking factors about the dam and lake system of Iraq is the volume of 
storage capacity (See Table - 9). The total on-river storage capacities for the Tigris will 
thus amount to 42 km3, and 8.2 km3 for the Euphrates River.  Additionally, at present, the 
Al-Adom dam on the Tigris River, with the capacity of 3.8 km3, is under construction.134 
With all the water systems that Iraq has, water can be transferred via canals from the 
Tigris to the Euphrates to regulate the growing water shortage that has developed due to 
the development projects of Syria and Turkey.135 
2.  Syria’s Dams and Lakes: 
Syria began exploiting the Euphrates’ water for irrigation and hydropower in the 
early 1960s. Syria, with the help of the Soviet Union, built the Tabqa Dam on the 
Euphrates in 1973. The Bath dam, which was completed in 1986, was the second Syrian 
project after Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates. The third project, the Tishreen Dam, which is 
a concrete dam on the Euphrates River at the end of Al-Assad Lake, was built between 
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Table 10136: Syria’s Water Projects on the Euphrates River 
Projects Storage capacity Purpose 
Tabqa Dam 12 billion m3 800 MW hydropower, irrigation 
Bath Dam 0.9 billion m3 81 MW hydropower, storage and irrigation 
Tshreen Dam 1.3 billion m3 630 MW hydropower and control 
 
There are 141 dams in Syria with a total storage capacity of 15.8 km³ (See Figure 
13).137 The largest dam is located at Al-Tabka on the Euphrates. It forms the Al-Assad 
Lake with a storage capacity of 11.2 km³. Medium-sized dams include the Al-Rastan 
(225 million m³), the Mouhardeh (50 million m³) and the Taldo (15.5 million m³). There 
are some 20 dams classified as small, the largest of which is the Dara'a, with a storage 
capacity of 15 million m³. The majority of these dams are located near Homs and Hama. 
Apart from the Al-Assad Lake, there are five lakes in Syria, the largest being Lake 
Jabboul, near Aleppo, with a surface area of about 239 km². Lake Qattineh, near Homs, is 
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3.  Turkey’s Dams and Lakes:  
Water resource studies were initiated in Turkey in the early 1930s, and the need 
for electric energy emerged as the most urgent priority, along with Turkey's pursuit of an 
ambitious economic and agricultural development program. In 1936, Turkey established 
the Electric Works Studies Agency to solve energy problem. Then in 1954, the State 
Hydrolic Works Agency was established when new requirements emerged through the 
studies. Though the government periodically attempted to secure funds for the 
development projects in the Euphrates–Tigris Basin, in the face of more pressing 
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economic priorities the idea of developing these two rivers did not become politically 
viable until the 1960s.140 
Turkey began constructing the Keban Dam on the Euphrates in the mid-1960s and 
finished the project in 1974. This was the first major dam on the Euphrates in Turkey. 
The second dam on Euphrates, the Karakaya Dam, was completed in 1988. This was the 
first dam built as part of the implementation of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP, 
Turkish acronym).  
The GAP is a large-scale, multi-sectorial regional development project with major 
implications for the region. It is one of the largest river basin development projects in the 
world and the largest of its kind ever undertaken by Turkey. The idea for the project 
began around 1963 as part of the regular five-year national development plan. In 1977, all 
the projects planned for the Southeast region of Turkey were combined under this project.  
The GAP project consumes 6.5% of the national budget with 1.5 million dollars 
being spent on the project daily.141 To emphasize the importance of the GAP Project, 
Dennis Avery, who now heads the Global Food Policy Institute in the USA, said that 
(While referring to the California Central Valley, an area of irrigated land, which is 25% 
smaller that the GAP region and which now produces more than $12 billion in primary 
crop values annually.): 
"We are on the eve of the greatest farming opportunity in history and it's precisely 
at that moment that Turkey is creating a new California."142  
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The GAP project has short-term as well as long-term objectives. The main 
objectives of the GAP project as a regional development idea are as follows: 
 To develop all the land and water resources in the region in order to revive 
regional economies; 
 To increase employment by accelerating land development and expanding 
agriculture; 
 To improve the gap between the Southeastern Anatolia Region and other 
regions by increasing production and welfare levels; 
 To complete the infrastructure projects in major cities to improve the 
quality of life and to attract industry and investment; 
 To organize the economic and physical infrastructure in rural areas by 
using the resources in the most useful ways and to direct urban growth in 
desired directions; and, 
 To contribute to the national objectives of sustained economic growth and 
export promotion by using the region’s resources.143  
The GAP (See Figure 14) project consists of 13 major irrigation and hydropower 
plants on both Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, seven in the lower Euphrates sub-basin and 
six in the Tigris sub-basin. The development region covers 28,520 square miles (9.5 
percent of the total area of Turkey), including six regions (Siirt, Diyarbakir, Mardin, 
Adiyaman, Urfa, and Gaziantep). The project envisages the construction of 22 dams and 
19 hydroelectric power plants on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers and their tributaries. 
                                                 
[http://www.turkishembassy-london.com/new_page_43.htm]. September 2002. 
143 Republic of Turkey/GAP Regional Development Administration, “GAP Industrialization Strategy.” 
[http://web.macam.ac.il/~arnon/IntME/water/TURKEY'S%20 APPROACH%202.htm]. April 2003. 
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a.   Principal Water Projects of Turkey in the Euphrates Basin145 
The Keban Dam: The dam is of large dimensions; about 3,600 feet 
long and about 656 feet high. The lake’s carrying capacity, with a surface area of 262 
square miles, is about 30 billions m3. The dam is used for electricity production alone and 
not for irrigation. It produces about 1,240 megawatts of electricity, but is capable of 
producing double that figure. 
The Karakaya Dam: The dam is intended for electricity production 
only and its production capacity is 1,800 megawatts. 
                                                 
144 Soffer, Rivers of Fire, p. 90. 
145 Ibid, pp. 91 – 94. 
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The Ataturk Dam: This is the largest and most costly of the GAP 
dams. It has been described as the fifth largest dam in the world. It is multipurpose and 
intended for irrigation and electricity. Its production capacity is 2,400 megawatts of 
electricity and irrigation of 5 million hectares. The dam’s lake stores about 48.4 billion 
m3 of water with a surface area of 338 square miles. 
Sanliurfa Tunnels: These are two tunnels to direct the water from the 
Ataturk Dam to the irrigation region. Each tunnel is 25 feet in diameter and 15 miles 
long. Together, they discharge 328 m3 of water per second. The flowing water produces 
50 megawatts of electricity at the Sanliurfa power station.  
The Birecik and Karakamish Dams: These dams are intended for 
electricity production and for irrigating land close to Syrian border. The carrying capacity 
of the dams is 47.6 billion m3 of water.  
b.   Turkey’s Water Projects on the Tigris146  
The Dicle and Krallizi Dams: Two dams are still under construction. 
The Kiralkizi Dam is intended to produce 90 megawatts of electricity, and the Dicle Dam 
110 megawatts. The Dicle Dam will also be used to irrigate 0.12 million hectares. 
The Batman Dam: This planned dam will generate 185 megawatts of 
electricity and irrigate 37, 744 hectares. 
The Garzan Dam: This dam will be located on the Garzan tributary 
and should produce 90 megawatts of electricity and irrigate 60,000 hectares of land. 
                                                 
146 Ibid, pp. 95 – 96. 
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The Ilisu Dam: This large dam is intended to produce about 1,200 
megawatts of electricity. It is also intended for irrigation. 
The Cizre Dam: It is intended to produce 240 megawatts of electricity 
and to irrigate 0.12 million hectares of land. 
By the end of 1991, the construction of 164 large dams, mostly rock-
filled or earth-filled dams, and 765 small dams had been completed and put into service 
for water supply, irrigation, hydropower and flood control; as a result total dam capacity 
is about 206 km³ in Turkey. However, with the new projects that have been initiated 
under GAP, Turkey’s storage capacity will be enormous. 
Exploitation of water resources typically requires expensive—and vulnerable—
civil engineering systems such as dams and pipelines. Large dams, like nuclear power 
plants, are potential weapons in the hands of an enemy. This creates a mutual hostage 
situation, which greatly reduces the incentives for states’ sources to employ violence to 
resolve conflicts. Furthermore, there is evidence that the development of water resources 
by antagonistic neighbors creates a network of common interest.”147 As a result, this 
creates a mutual hostage situation in which all parties are at risk, if there is tension in the 
region since each of the states have very expensive but vulnerable water projects. It also 
strengthens the probability of the cooperation in the basin. 
Since 1960s, using the basin’s water for producing electricity gained more 
importance. Since hydropower production is a non-consumptive water activity, more 
power generation minimizes the political and environmental impact on downstream 
                                                 
147 Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, p. 20. 
85 
countries, because in order to produce hydropower, upstream countries let more water 
flow to the downstream countries’ territories. 
On the other hand, as explained in Chapter III, the discharge of the Euphrates and 
Tigris Rivers is subject to extreme fluctuations, both seasonally and annually. As far as 
agriculture is concerned, the rivers’ seasonal and annual fluctuation is very unfavorable. 
This means that considerable engineering capacity and efficient water management 
systems need to be built in order to control the rivers’ flow effectively. Although one 
function of upstream dam building—water abstraction—may cause tension, it is not only 
beneficial but also necessary to the downstream state. For instance, 1988–1989 were the 
driest years of the last 50 years; the deficiency in the natural flow was compensated by 
water from the Keban and Karakaya reservoirs protecting Syria and Iraq from the dire 
consequence of the drought.148 
Finally, it should be noted that the overall process of water resource development 
in the basin during the last three decades has been in accordance with previous 
agreements signed by the three riparian states in order to regulate the flow. The 
construction of enormous water storage capacity in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq has partially 
enhanced their sense of water security, while increasing their vulnerability to their 
expensive water projects. 
F.    IN THE EUPHRATES–TIGRIS BASIN, NONE OF THE RIPARIAN 
COUNTRIES IS FACING AN IMMINENT WATER SHORTAGE 
There are many facts that prove that none of the riparian countries is facing an 
imminent water shortage. For example, Turkey has been able to abide fully by the 
                                                 
148 Soffer, Rivers of Fire, p. 140. 
86 
commitment it made in 1987 to release a yearly average of 500 cubic meters a second, 
summer and winter. In practice the flow often exceeds this considerably. In 1995, for 
example, the annual average flow was around 830 cubic meters a second. In the first half 
of 1996, Turkey has been releasing water to Syria at between 1,147 and 1,684 cubic 
meters a second, far above the amount specified in the 1987 Protocol149. Additionally, 
Turkey provided 900 cubic meters of water per second on average to Syria over the last 
three years. 
If Turkey, Syria and Iraq complete their own projects for using the Euphrates– 
Tigris basin’s water effectively in order to support their economical and agricultural 
development, it will be necessary to calculate whether a shortage of water in Euphrates 
and Tigris may be expected. Before making the calculation, it should be emphasized that 
Turkey and Iraq have ability to balance the shortfall in one river at the expense of the 
other. 
Table 11150 shows that until 2020, there will be a surplus of water in the Euphrates 
and Tigris. There may  be a shortage of water in the Euphrates in 2020s, but Tigris water 
will be able to compensate for it. After 2030s, however, a situation may arise in which 
there will be a shortage of water in the Euphrates and Tigris. 
 
 
                                                 
149 Republic of Turkey  Ministry of Foreign Affairs Home Page, A Scramble For Water Resources Is 
Under Way In The Middle East. 
 
150 Soffer, Rivers of Fire, p. 106. 
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Table 11:151 Demand and Supply of Water in Euphrates – Tigris Basin (billion m3) 



























































                                                 
151 Iraqi demands based on 1980s use. The table is based on the author’s interpretation from available data 































Finally, the annual discharge of the rivers has been more than enough for the three 
riparian countries' needs. However, they have purposefully exaggerated the water scarcity 
that dictates the political behaviors of those in the basin, because of each riparian 
country's self-serving cost-benefit mindset regarding the future. Although the extreme 
seasonal and annual fluctuations of the twin rivers have always been a great challenge to 
parties, it has led them towards collective cooperation to solve their problems and control 














V – CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS 
 
A.        CONCLUSION 
Most recent studies and reports indicate that there is a significant risk of imminent 
conflicts and wars over water in the Middle East because of water scarcity. It was made 
popular by former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s statement that, “The next war 
in the Middle East will not be over politics but over water.”152 Apart from exaggerating 
the scarcity of water resources and the likelihood of war, the major flaw of this literature 
is that it is more problem-orientated. Additionally, the mindset of those who follow this 
literature regarding water scarcity as a sole source of conflict was too narrow, and that 
some of the most interesting, and compelling examples of water-related conflicts were a 
function of the relationships among social, political, and economic factors, including 
economic development.153 
Contrary to what is mentioned above about water wars, precisely because water is 
so essential to life, even hostile co-riparian countries have historically sought to 
compromise rather go to war over water, even as disputes have raged on other issues.154 
Indeed, the historical record is predominantly of water acting as a catalyst for cooperation 
rather than conflict. Parallel to this idea, in this thesis, I explained that the conflicting 
representation of hydro politics in the Euphrates–Tigris basin is unconvincing, for five 
main reasons: 
                                                 
152 Turton, Moodley and Meissner,An Analysis of the Role of Virtual Water in Southern Africa in Meeting 
Water Scarcity. 
 
153 Environment, Development & Conflict (EDC News) Web page, Water Conflict Databases. 
154 Wolf, Development and Transboundary Waters: Obstacles and Opportunities. 
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First and most importantly, in Euphrates–Tigris Basin, none of the riparian 
countries is facing an imminent water shortage. Despite some sensational political 
rhetoric and pessimist predictions, water scarcity in the Euphrates and Tigris Basin has 
never been as acute as it has been in other water basins in the Middle East. The basin’s 
riparian countries purposefully exaggerate the water scarcity that dictates their political 
behaviors regarding the basin because of their self-serving cost-benefit mindset relative 
to the future. The fact is that the real demand for water has not yet exceeded supply in the 
basin. 
Second, it is remarkable that the three riparian countries have been engaged in 
continuous technical consultations and political negotiations over water since the early 
1960s; this shows their effort to avoid water conflict. In the process of their diplomatic 
exchange, all parties have understood that the international water resources cannot be 
monopolized or subjected to the control of a single riparian state. This active, continuous, 
and critical interchange has also convinced them that cooperation over the water issue is 
not necessarily a zero-sum game, but could be a win-win situation in which all parties 
would gain from cooperation.155 As a result there are many treaties which have been 
signed by the three riparian countries that lessen the strength of water scarcity issues in 
the politic arena. Additionally, despite the political disturbances in the region, as Issam El 
Chalabi and Farouk Majzoub note, these bilateral and trilateral agreements generally 
worked well and could serve as basis for a more extensive cooperation between the 
riparian countries.156 
                                                 
155 Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East,  p. 156. 
156 Ibid. p. 135. 
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Since every theory which claims water conflict in the basin shows Turkey’s water 
development projects as one of the main reasons for tension in the basin, it should be 
noted that Turkey has demonstrated its eagerness to find ways of reaching a basis for 
cooperating with Syria and Iraq to use the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers fairly. For 
example, at the January 1992 Moscow multilateral talks, Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin 
stated:  
Concerning water, we are aware of its importance and its regional implications. 
We see it as an integral element of overall regional cooperation. We are ready to 
cooperate in this respect. 
 
The main Turkish argument has been that the dependency of the downstream 
states on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers has not caused Turkey to use them irrationally 
or unreasonably or at the cost of neighboring countries. The Turkish government has 
repeatedly announced that Turkey has never had any intention of using its upper stream 
position as political leverage as feared by the Arab states. 
Third, the construction of enormous water storage capacity in Syria, Iraq and 
Turkey has partially enhanced their sense of water security. Projects which have been 
implemented by Turkey, Syria and Iraq for flood control, irrigation and electricity 
generation have not caused significant ecological consequences. The riparian countries 
have harmoniously managed to tackle these water problems through negotiations and 
cooperative measures. Additionally, these expensive projects increased the probability of 
cooperation in the basin because of their vulnerability. More importantly, the major water 
problems arise primarily from the mode of water allocation within states rather than to 
water allocation between states. 
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Fourth, the so-called water conflict in the Euphrates-Tigris basin is not an 
autonomous issue, but is the result of numerous causes which have nothing to do with 
‘water scarcity’ in the proper sense. There are many other factors which cause tension in 
the region, such as territorial disputes over Hatay between Syria and Turkey; internal 
problems, domestic political situations in each country; the Kurdish problem; Syrian 
support to a Kurdish separatist terrorist organization (PKK),  and many other issues 
unrelated to water issues. Despite the territorial disputes and general atmosphere of 
tension in the region, it is remarkable that riparian countries have shown great efforts to 
avoid conflict and have been engaged in continuous technical consultation and political 
negotiations over water since the early 1960s. This progressive process has obviously 
undermined the likelihood of conflict between states. 
Fifth, there are some norms that countries follow while using the basin’s water. 
The historical data given in Chapter IV basically proves that upper stream countries never 
wanted to make down stream countries suffer from water scarcity and always released as 
much water as they could, while not using the water as a political weapon. 
Finally, in contrast to what is conventionally believed, first, water resources have 
never been the cause of military conflict in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin. It is important to 
state here that the main aim of this study is to establish that the conventional wisdom of 
“water war in the Euphrates–Tigris River Basin” has been exaggerated by pessimistic 
commentators who seldom attempt to clarify precisely what water-related causes of 




B.      RECOMENDATIONS: 
It is possible to recognize evidence of water strategies stretching over more than 
six millennia in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. In this thesis, however, I mainly focused on 
the era from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire onwards. There are two distinct 
phases in the growth of water resource management in modern Mesopotamia as 
mentioned in Chapter IV. Since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the three 
parties generally pursued a cooperative policy in order to determine the best mechanism 
for optimal management of the basin’s water. The three riparian countries of the 
Euphrates-Tigris Rivers have achieved this with the help of the regulatory framework that 
they have decided in international water-related agreements. 
During the first phase—after the dissolution of Ottoman Empire to the 1960s—
there are no signs of water conflict; the main approach to water resource management is 
an engineering approach and water is used only for irrigation not for energy production. 
The water resource situation in the basin started to change in the 1960s, when all riparian 
countries initiated their large-scale exploitation projects. During the second phase -from 
the 1960s onward- a strategic importance has been given to the water in the basin and 
Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have had ambitious plans for exploiting the basin’s water not only 
for irrigation but also for generating electricity. For the first time, there was an attempt to 
store water from the time it was generated by nature to the time it was needed. 
Through the 60 year period, from 1960 to the end of 2020, it seems that there will 
be one important change from excess water availability to a situation in which there may 
not be enough water to meet the planned requirements of the Euphrates-Tigris basin’s 
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riparian states. Therefore, from 2020 onwards we can foresee a new phase in water 
management, characterized by growing water shortages and decreased quality. 
It is impossible to estimate the impact of this decline in water volume and quality 
on the basin’s countries at the present time. Nevertheless, with continued population 
growth and each country’s agricultural and industrial development, it is obvious that new 
emphasis will be given to the value of water at the next phase. The critical factor will be 
the maximum economic productivity of the utilization of a cubic meter of water. Under 
these considerations, in order to maximize the economic productivity of water utilization 
and prevent the future conflicts: 
 Turkey, Syria and Iraq should design a water pact to regulate the allocation of 
trans-boundary water resources. Each country’s quota should be determined 
by its population and by its contribution to the formation of water resources. 
As a recent agreement illustrates, whatever the volume of the water that 
crosses the Turkish-Syrian border is, Syria keeps 42% of the water for itself 
and allows 58% of that quantity to cross its border to Iraq; Turkey releases a 
yearly average of 500 cubic meters a second.  
 Maximum opportunities should be created for water management institutions 
to cooperate at the regional level rather than setting up new interstate entities. 
If each country creates new national institutions simply to highlight its 
independence, no practical results will be achieved. 
 Regional cooperation in agriculture should be encouraged. This measure 
would make it possible to significantly reduce water consumption since most 
of the basin’s water is used for irrigation. 
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 Special funds should be allocated by each country to finance the maintenance 
and operation of the region’s water management system. 
 Market regulation in water management should be encouraged. 
 All countries should maximize the use of water-efficient technologies, since 
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